Scalia 18:22: Thou Shall Not Lie with the Academic and Law School Elite; It Is an Abomination--\u3ci\u3eRomer v. Evans\u3c/i\u3e and America\u27s Culture War by Delchin, Steven A.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 47 | Issue 1
1996
Scalia 18:22: Thou Shall Not Lie with the
Academic and Law School Elite; It Is an
Abomination--Romer v. Evans and America's
Culture War
Steven A. Delchin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Steven A. Delchin, Scalia 18:22: Thou Shall Not Lie with the Academic and Law School Elite; It Is an Abomination--Romer v. Evans and
America's Culture War, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 207 (1996)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol47/iss1/8
COMMENT
SCALiA 18:22: THou SHALL NOT LIE wrrH THE
ACADEMIC AND LAW SCHOOL ELITE; IT IS AN
ABOMINATION'-ROMER V. EVANS AND AMERICA'S
CULTURE WAR
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court in Bowers v.
Hardwick2 remarked that "[t]he law ... is constantly based on no-
tions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral
choices are to be invalidated... the courts will be very busy
indeed."3 In upholding a Georgia anti-sodomy statute and rejecting
the claim that there is a fundamental right to engage in homosexu-
al conduct, the Court added that "[tlo hold that the act of homo-
sexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would
be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching."4 Sadly, the Court
may have gone barely a decade before it jettisoned its own advice.
In Romer v. Evans' the Court struck down a Colorado state consti-
tutional amendment prohibiting preferential treatment for homosexu-
als-an amendment that was arguably the expression of traditional
moral values by a majority of Colorado's electorate.
This Comment examines how the recent Romer decision struck
down Colorado's amendment, popularly known as Amendment 2,
as violating the Equal Protection Clause. Part I of the Comment
provides a background on Amendment 2, including a synopsis of
1. LEVITICUS 18:22 ("Thou shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an
abomination."). I would like to thank Professors George W. Dent, Jonathan L. Entin, and
William P. Marshall for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Comment.
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3. Id. at 196.
4. Id. at 197 (Burger, J., concurring).
5. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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the arguments for and against the amendment as well as a review
of the majority and dissenting opinions. Part II offers a catalogue
of potential explanations for the Romer decision in an attempt to
reconcile its outcome with the Court's jurisprudence. Finally, Part
1H1 comments on how Romer reflects America's cultural debate
over homosexuality in particular and the role of traditional moral
values in political discourse in general.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 3, 1992, Colorado voters approved the statewide
referendum known as Amendment 2 which added section 30(b) to
Article 2 of the Colorado state constitution.6 The amendment re-
pealed all existing state and local statutes, regulations, and policies
extending preferential status to individuals on the basis of sexual
orientation, and prohibited the adoption of similar measures in the
future, absent an amendment to the Colorado state constitution.7
Although supporters of Amendment 2 were outspent by opponents
by nearly a 2-1 margin' and polls prior to the election consistently
showed the proposal to be failing,9 the referendum nevertheless
passed by a margin of 813,966 to 710,151 (53.4% to 46.6%)."o
The impulse behind Amendment 2, which never did go into
effect," stemmed in large measure from the enactment of pro-ho-
6. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo. 1994), affd, 116 S.Ct. 1620
(1996). This Comment will designate this case as "Evans I". Amendment 2 provides:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all
respects self-executing.
COLO. CONST., art. H, § 30(b).
7. See Evans II, 882 P.2d at 1339 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1285
(Colo. 1993)). This Comment will identify the 1993 case as "Evans I."
8. See Petitioner's Brief at 7, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
9. See John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Call for Heightened Judi-
cial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153, 154 n.5 (1993).
10. See Evans II, 882 P.2d at 1338.
11. First, in January 1993, a Colorado state district court temporarily enjoined the
amendment and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1270. The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Romer v. Evans, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
The trial court then held that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause and
issued a permanent injunction, Evans v. Romer, No. 92 CV 7223, 1993 WL 518586
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993), which was affirmed, in a second opinion, by the Colora-
do Supreme Court. Evans II, 882 P.2d at 1335. Finally, the United States Supreme Court
heard the case, and held that Amendment 2 was unconstitutional. Romer v. Evans, 116 S.
Ct. 1620 (1996).
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mosexual'2 ordinances in three Colorado municipalities: Aspen,
Boulder, and Denver. These ordinances extended legal protection to
individuals on the basis of sexual orientation in the areas of em-
ployment, housing, and public accommodations.'3 A majority of
Colorado's voters chose to repeal these ordinances and foreclose
the enactment of similar laws and policies in the future. 4
Shortly after the election, on November 12, 1992, Richard G.
Evans, a homosexual employed by the City of Denver, together
with several other homosexual individuals and governmental enti-
ties,"s sued to enjoin Amendment 2 and have it declared unconsti-
tutional on its face.'6 The case eventually reached the United
States Supreme Court where the State of Colorado and the chal-
lengers of Amendment 2 advanced their arguments.' 7
A. Arguments Made Before The Supreme Court
1. Colorado's Defense of Amendment 2
The State of Colorado argued that state and local laws that
establish minority status for homosexuals equate to "special rights"
that are unavailable to the public at large.'" According to Colora-
do, Amendment 2 was designed to eliminate such special rights. 9
At the same time, however, Colorado argued that Amendment 2
left homosexuals with the same rights that they enjoyed prior to
12. Within the homosexual movement labels are important. This Comment uses the
term "homosexual" in favor of the term "gay" as "gay" has become a political term
associated with a movement that rejects the moral superiority of heterosexuality and de-
mands that traditional religious understandings about homosexuality be understood as fun-
damentally in error. See MARGARET CRUIKSHANK, THE GAY AND LEsBIAN LIBERATION
MOVEMfNT 3 (1992) (noting that "homosexual" became "gay" on June 27, 1969, when
"gay power" was bom).
13. See ASPEN MUNICIPAL CODE § 13-98 (1977); BOULDER REV. CODE §§ 12-1-1 to
12-1-11 (1987); DENVER REV. MUNICIPAL CODE, Art. IV §§ 28-92 to 28-116 (1991).
14. One of the campaign themes devised by some supporters of Amendment 2 pro-
claimed "no special rights for homosexuals." Stephanie L. Grauerholz, Comment,
Colorado's Amendment 2 Defeated: The Emergence of a Fundamental Right to Participate
in the Political Process, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 841, 847 (1995). For a debate over the
meaning of "special rights," see infra note 119.
15. The challengers were comprised of eight homosexuals, one heterosexual, the Boul-
der Valley School District RE-2, the City and County of Denver, the City Council of
Aspen, the City of Boulder, and the City of Aspen. See Grauerholz, supra note 14, at
845 n.31.
16. See Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 19678, at *2-4 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
Jan. 15, 1993), affd on other grounds, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
419 (1993).
17. The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari on February 21,
1995. Romer v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995).
18. See Petitioner's Brief at 6-7, Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-
1039).
19. See id. at 6.
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the enactment of such laws and thus did not deprive them of
basic civil rights available to other citizens?
The State of Colorado characterized the campaign to pass
Amendment 2 as "spirited" and a "classic example of democratic
self-government."'" It argued that Amendment 2 was not the prod-
uct of a naked, arbitrary desire to harm homosexuals, as some
opponents charged.' Rather, the State articulated at least six inde-
pendent interests that it maintained were advanced by Amendment
2.
First, the State argued that Amendment 2 preserved the integ-
rity of civil rights laws by setting priorities and conserving the
limited resources that the State has at its disposal for combating
discrimination.'a Colorado argued that amending the State's civil
rights statutes to include protections on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion would represent a "drastic departure" from the historical pos-
ture of such laws.24 Moreover, the State argued that, unlike sus-
pect and other needy classes, homosexuals are already a "politically
powerful and relatively privileged special interest group,' '2s and
extending such special protections to homosexuals would only tax
an already strained state budget.'s
Second, Colorado argued that Amendment 2 would achieve
uniformity in civil rights laws which would "promote efficient
enforcement, [and] ... maximize individual liberty, including the
preservation of traditional social norms."'27 The State added that
uniformity fosters greater economic and legal predictability for
employers and property owners.?
Third, and relatedly, the State contended that Amendment 2
would promote the stability of Colorado's political system by
guarding it from the effects of "unrestrained factionalism" through
state-wide uniformity of the laws.29 Colorado had argued that the
issue of homosexual rights is highly contentious and that munici-
pality-by-municipality conflicts over homosexuality, as reflected by
20. See id.
21. Id. at 7.
22. See Reply Brief at 14-15, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
Challengers and opponents of Amendment 2 had argued that the amendment was driven
solely by antipathy toward homosexuals. See also infra note 44 and accompanying text.
23. See Petitioner's Brief at 41, Romer (No. 94-1039).
24. See id. at 43. In fact, there was some fear that granting special class status might
lead to affirmative action for homosexuals. Id. at 43 n.31.
25. Id. at 42. As evidence of this political influence, the State noted that homosexuals
have been successful at, among other things, repealing sodomy statutes in 27 states and
including sexual orientation in the federal hate crimes statute. Id. at 42 n.29.
26. See id. at 41.
27. Id. at 47.
28. See Petitioner's Brief at 47, Romer (No. 94-1039).
29. See id. at 47-48 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974)).
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the ordinances in Aspen, Boulder, and Denver," have the potential
to "seriously fragment Colorado's body politic."'" Deterring such
unrestricted factionalism was thus argued to be a legitimate state
interest.3
2
Fourth, Colorado argued that Amendment 2 would enhance
religious liberty.33 Under the amendment, landlords and private
employees with profound religious objections to homosexuality
would not be under threat of governmental sanction to compromise
those beliefs.34 Similarly, religious organizations, including church-
es, would not be forced into hiring homosexuals as employees or
clergy.35 Closely related to Colorado's interest in protecting reli-
gious liberty was the State's interest in enhancing associational
privacy.36 For example, Colorado argued that Amendment 2 would
have repealed the Aspen ordinance that forced churches to open
their facilities to homosexual groups if they were open to other
community organizations.37 Similarly, individuals who hold sincere
religious beliefs against homosexuality would not be required to
share housing with practicing homosexuals under the threat of
sexual orientation laws. Thus, the State's fifth argument was that
Amendment 2 would protect individuals' personal privacy and
intimate association, and that in this regard, it was a very libertari-
an measure.
3 9
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Colorado argued that
Amendment 2 would foster both familial privacy and parents'
ability to instill moral values in their children.' The State argued
that the family is the vehicle by which society passes down cher-
ished moral and cultural values to subsequent generations.4' "The
implicit endorsement of homosexuality fostered by laws granting
special protections," Colorado contended, "could undermine the
efforts of some parents to teach traditional moral values."'42 Thus,
Amendment 2 was a rational response by a majority of Coloradans
to preserve their traditional moral values.
30. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
31. Petitioner's Brief at 47, Romer (No. 94-1039).
32. See id. at 47-48. The Supreme Court, in fact, has recognized that deterring faction-
alism can be a legitimate state interest. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974);
Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 803 (1983).
33. See Petitioner's Brief at 44, Romer (No. 94-1093).
34. See id.
35. See id. at 44-45.
36. See id. at 44.
37. See ASPEN MUNICIPAL CODE § 13-98.
38. See Petitioner's Brief at 45, Romer (No. 94-1093).
39. See id.
40. See id. at 45-46.
41. See id. at 46.
42. Id.
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The implicit, underlying theme of the State's defense of
Amendment 2 is that the people of Colorado have a right to trans-
late their traditional views of sexual morality into public policy.
Under this view, moral opposition to homosexuality by a majority
of citizens can serve as a legitimate basis for State action, just as
the Supreme Court declared ten years earlier in Bowers v.
Hardwick.' In a sense, Colorado was merely asking the Supreme
Court to respect the process of democratic self-government in Col-
orado where a majority of citizens had expressed their traditional
values through the ballot.
2. The Challenge to Amendment 2
The challengers sharply disputed the justifications proffered by
Colorado on behalf of Amendment 2. They charged that Colorado
distorted the "real purpose" of Amendment 2 which was "the effec-
tuation of hostility and antipathy toward an unpopular group."'
They also claimed that Colorado "paint[ed] a distorted picture of
the amendment as a benign and libertarian 'shield' barring intrusive
regulations of private persons."'45 Instead they likened it to a
sword that cuts a wide swath in the protection of homosexuals
from arbitrary discrimination." The challengers contended that
"Amendment 2's selectivity can be explained only by the illegiti-
mate purpose of targeting gay people based on antipathy and ste-
reotypes."'47 The amendment would not only deny homosexuals
special rights, they argued, but would also impose a special disabil-
ity upon them because it would deprive them of even the protec-
tion of laws of general applicability." Thus, the challengers con-
cluded, Amendment 2 would deprive homosexuals, and only homo-
sexuals, of basic rights that are enjoyed by all other Coloradans."
43. 478 U.S. at 186 (1986).
44. Respondent's Brief at 49, Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
The challengers specifically pointed to campaign literature from Colorado for Family Val-
ues ("CFV"), a non-profit corporation based in Colorado Springs, as evidence of the ani-
mus directed toward homosexuals during the Amendment 2 campaign. For example, short-
ly before the election CFV had distributed brochures to 800,000 homes claiming that the
homosexual lifestyle includes sexually molesting children and that homosexuals seek spe-
cial rights for this very lifestyle. See id. at 48.
45. Id. at 39. See supra note 39 and accompanying text
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. See Respondent's Brief at 10, Romer (No. 94-1039). The challengers noted that
Amendment 2 bars "any ... claim" requesting relief from arbitrary discrimination based
on gay, lesbian, or bisexual orientation. Id. at 10-11. Thus, for example, they argued that
while private employers are prohibited under Colorado law' from terminating employees for
engaging in lawful activity off the employer's premises, CoLo. REV. STAT., § 24-34-402.5,
homosexuals could not seek relief under this law because of Amendment 2. See id.
49. See id. at 10 n.l1. Amendment 2 refers only to "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation." Thus, heterosexuals are unaffected by the amendment Idl
[Vol. 47:207
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The challengers of Amendment 2 raised two basic arguments
to support their constitutional challenge. First, they claimed that the
amendment would deprive homosexuals of the right to participate
equally in the political process," a right which the Colorado Su-
preme Court deemed was fundamental and subject to strict scrutiny
under equal protection analysis." Secondly, and in response to the
underlying theme of the State's defense, the challengers, as well as
other opponents of Amendment 2, claimed that the campaign be-
hind Amendment 2 was driven by antipathy and the desire to harm
homosexuals 2 and therefore bears no rational relationship to any
legitimate state purpose.53 The challengers characterized Amend-
ment 2 as being "unprecedented in both the selectivity and severity
of discrimination that it imposes on a particular group of per-
sons."
54
In responding to the six independent interests advanced by
Colorado, the challengers argued first that Colorado's interest in
conserving fiscal resources in order to protect suspect and other
needy classes was merely a pretext because the enforcement of
such laws is undertaken on a private scale and thus consumes no
governmental resources. 5 More to the point, they argued, was
Amendment 2's degree of selectivity. The amendment singled out
homosexuals exclusively from the protection of state and local anti-
discrimination laws and yet simultaneously continued to protect all
other classes of individuals, whether they are veterans, smokers, or
50. See id. at 15-35.
51. Evans 11, 882 P.2d 1335, 1349 (Colo. 1994) (quoting Evans 1, 854 P.2d 1270,
1282 (Colo. 1993)). The Colorado Supreme Court found that Amendment 2 infringed
upon this fundamental right because it "fenced out" homosexuals from equal participation
in the political process. Id.
52. See Respondent's Brief at 39, Romer (No. 94-1039) (arguing Amendment 2 illegiti-
mately targets people based on "antipathy and stereotypes"). William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-
Election Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative Challenges: Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian
Tyranny, and Direct Democracy, 55 Oluo ST. LJ. 583, 622 (1994) (discussing the use of
"emotional, unsupported stereotypes" by supporters of anti-homosexual initiatives); Seth
Hilton, Comment, Restraints on Homosexual Rights Legislation: Is There a Fundamental
Right to Participate in the Political Process?, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445, 472 (1995)
(referring to Amendment 2 as one manifestation of "hatred" toward homosexuals); David
P. Tedhams, The Reincarnation of "Jim Crow:" A Thirteenth Amendment Analysis of
Colorado's Amendment 2, 4 TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REV. 133, 156 (1994) ("It is
my contention that the methods used by [certain supporters of Amendment 2] rose to the
level of conspiracy, defined under § 1985(3), to deprive homosexuals of their civil
rights:'); Stephen Zamansky, Note, Colorado's Amendment 2 and Homosexuals' Right to
Equal Protection of the Law, 35 B.C. L. REV. 221, 256 (1993) (arguing that "[t]he only
objective of Amendment 2 is 'a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,'
which is not a legitimate governmental purpose") (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985)).
53. See Respondent's Brief at 35-49, Romer (No. 94-1039).
54. Id. at 35.
55. See id. at 41-42.
1996]
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even heterosexuals. 6 The challengers argued that this degree of
selectivity left unexplained how Colorado's purported interest in
conserving fiscal resources was furthered when all other groups in
the State were still entitled to protection."
In a similar fashion, the challengers argued that the State's
second purported interest-that of achieving uniform civil rights
laws-left unexplained Amendment 2's scope and selectivity be-
cause the amendment "tolerate[d] any degree of disuniformity in
local anti-discrimination laws so long as the laws provide no relief
from discrimination based on gay, lesbian, or bisexual orienta-
tion. "
58
Third, the challengers claimed that Colorado's interest in de-
terring factionalism was spurious because factionalism is the es-
sence of democracy. 9 At any rate, the State's attempt at suppress-
ing factionalism was skewed because it suppressed only one side of
the debate.' The challengers equally dismissed the State's fourth
and fifth interests of promoting religious liberty and associational
privacy.' They argued that "government must operate on purely
secular motives and has no legitimate interest in engaging in reli-
giously motivated discrimination."'62 Furthermore, choosing not to
protect homosexuals from governmental discrimination certainly
does not facilitate religious freedom, especially since government
officials have no constitutional right to association and may not act
on their religiously-grounded views about homosexuals.63 The
challengers argued, moreover, that Amendment 2's selectivity be-
lied its purported concern for religious and associational freedom
because, while individuals could discriminate against homosexuals,
laws prohibiting discrimination based on marital status, for exam-
ple, were left intact.' Thus, they claimed that "Amendment 2's
indifference to religious liberty and associational freedom except
when pursued at the expense of gay people indicates that
56. See id. at 42.
57. See id. The challengers actually posited that based on the State's logic of conserv-
ing governmental resources, State laws could prohibit police departments from providing
police protection to homosexuals in their neighborhoods. Id.
58. Respondent's Brief at 44, Romer (No. 94-1039). Once again, opponents claimed
that "[b]oth Amendment 2's selectivity and severity ... indicate that promotion of unifor-
mity is but a pretext, a goal about which the State is utterly indifferent except as a cover
for burdening gay people." Id.
59. See id. at 47.
60. See id. The attempt to suppress such factionalism may also raise First Amendment
concerns. See id.
61. See id. at 39.
62. Id. at 40.
63. See Respondent's Brief at 40, Romer (No. 94-1039).
64. See id. at 40-41.
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protection of such freedoms is a pretext for hostility and bias, not
a rationally attributable purpose."'
The challengers also attacked the State's sixth argument-that
Amendment 2 legitimately advanced parents' ability to instill moral
values in their children.' Aside from their claim that the State
does not "endorse" the homosexual lifestyle when it outlaws dis-
crimination against homosexuals,' the challengers also contended
that "Amendment 2 is far too broad to be a rational means of
preserving traditional sexual morality."6 They argued that "even if
an interest in preserving traditional sexual morality [could] justify
state laws that actually regulate sexual conduct, such an interest
[could not] justify Amendment 2's blanket authorization of all
discrimination against a class of people, even discrimination in
contexts that are unrelated to sexuality or sexual conduct." '69
Finally, the challengers urged that the use of moral arguments
to support discrimination against homosexuals is impermissible if
driven by nothing more than antipathy toward the group.:' The
implication was that the people of Colorado were driven by hatred
and intolerance toward homosexuals which would, in turn, make it
impossible for the Court to credit Colorado's purported rationales
for Amendment 2. The Supreme Court apparently agreed with the
challengers' arguments in toto and struck down Amendment 2 on
the ground that the amendment was, in fact, born of animosity to-
ward homosexuals.7
B. The Supreme Court and Romer v. Evans
Romer v. Evans has been hailed as a major homosexual rights
victory for invalidating Amendment 2 as violating the Equal
Protection Clause.' At the same time, however, some commenta-
tors have expressed their concern over the paucity of legal analysis
in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, especially his failure to
distinguish the relevant cases. 4 As one commentator remarked,
65. Id. at 41.
66. See id. at 44-46.
67. See id. at 44-45.
68. Respondent's Brief at 45-56, Romer (No. 94-1039).
69. Id. at 45 n.32.
70. See id. (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 447
(1985)); Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
71. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
72. See, e.g., David A. Kaplan and David Klaichman, A Battle, Not the War, NEws-
WEEK, June 3, 1996, at 24 (noting that Romer is a major victory for homosexuals); THE
RECORDER, Equal Protection or "Kulturkampf ?; Debate Rages Over Kennedy's Analysis,
Scalia's Vitriol in Landmark Gay Rights Case, May 22, 1996, at 10, available in LEXIS
News Library Curnws File (characterizing the decision as one of the most important legal
victories for homosexuals).
73. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
74. Hence the claim by the dissent that the majority opinion is "long on emotive
21519961
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Romer "contains precious little case law [and] is remarkable for
what it does not cite, rather than for what it does."'75
Justice Kennedy, writing for a 6-3 majority, opened his opin-
ion with Justice Harlan's admonition in Plessy v. Ferguson6 that
the Constitution "neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens." He held that Amendment 2 ran afoul of this principle of
legal neutrality and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause.78 To
reach this holding, Justice Kennedy first addressed Colorado's
argument that Amendment 2 places homosexuals in the same posi-
tion as all other citizens in Colorado. 9 He promptly rejected
Colorado's characterization of the measure as merely denying ho-
mosexuals special rights, arguing instead that the amendment con-
signed homosexuals to a "solitary class with respect to transactions
and relations in both the private and governmental spheres."8 In
the private sphere, Justice Kennedy argued, the effects are "far-
reaching."'" Homosexuals are foreclosed from seeking special legal
protections in public accommodations, housing, real estate, insur-
ance, health and welfare services, private education, and employ-
ment. 2 In comparable fashion, according to Justice Kennedy, ho-
mosexuals are precluded from securing specific legal protection in
the governmental sphere. 3
Of course, these policies and laws all deal with specific
protections for homosexuals. Thus, Justice Kennedy also argued
that "[iut is a fair, if not necessary, inference from the broad lan-
guage of the amendment that it deprives gays and lesbians even of
the protection of general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary
utterance [but] short on relevant legal citation." Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See
also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Closing Argument; Twisting and Turning on Gay Rights, TEXAS
LAwYER, June 3, 1996, at 27 (stating that Kennedy's majority opinion is marked by
"crude, superficial, and evasive legal reasoning").
75. Tom Stoddard, The High Court Erases a Stigma, NAT'L LJ., June 3, 1996, at
A19.
76. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
77. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing)). The reference to Justice Harlan's opinion in Plessy may be an implicit attempt by
Kennedy to equate the demands of a vocal homosexual minority with the struggle against
racial segregation that was at issue in Plessy.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 1624.
80. Id. at 1625. Justice Kennedy argued that the legal change in homosexuals' legal
status is "sweeping" and "comprehensive." Id.
81. Id.
82. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626 (citing ASPEN MuN CIPAL CODE §§ 13-98(b), (c)
(1977); BOULDER REV. CODE §§ 12-1-2, 12-1-3 (1987); DENVER REV. MUNICIPAL CODE,
Art. IV §§ 28-93 to 28-95, § 28-97 (1991)).
83. See id. at 1626. For example, specific legal protections for homosexuals in state
employment, under Colorado Executive Order D0035 (1990), would have been rescinded
by Amendment 2. See id. (citing Evans I, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284-85 (Colo. 1993)).
216 [Vol. 47:207
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discrimination in governmental and private settings." 4 Justice
Kennedy claimed that the Colorado Supreme Court had not decided
whether Amendment 2 would also affect laws of general applica-
tion." However, he argued that even if it did, this was unneces-
sary to determine given that Amendment 2 not only stripped homo-
sexuals of special rights but also imposed a "special disability"
upon them and them alone.86 Unlike other citizens, homosexuals
under Amendment 2 would have to either persuade fellow citizens
to amend the state constitution to obtain specific protection or, de-
pending on how Amendment 2 is construed, to enact laws of gen-
eral applicability.' Unfortunately, at this point, Justice Kennedy's
analysis merely ends and does not articulate why equal protection
is violated if a group is required to amend the Constitution (or, in
fact, merely resort to a higher level of decision making) in order to
secure specific legal protections. As Justice Scalia argues in his
dissent, such a consequence is not unknown to the law.""
Justice Kennedy's opinion continues with a reference to the
Court's modem equal protection jurisprudence and the tripartite
standard of review under which governmental action is analyzed. 9
If neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is implicated, a
legislative classification will be upheld if it bears a rational relation
to some legitimate state interest.' °
Justice Kennedy, however, found that Amendment 2 "defies"
this conventional inquiry for two reasons:
First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing
a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
84. Id. at 1626 (emphasis added). Specifically, Justice Kennedy had in mind such laws
of general application as COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104, which prohibits "unfair discrimi-
nation" in insurance. The concern was that Amendment 2 would prohibit a governmental
official from making a determination that a decision based upon a person's homosexuality
was arbitrary, in effect denying homosexuals even basic protection from arbitrary govern-
mental action. See id.
85. See id. Such a consequence would "compound the constitutional difficulties" with
Amendment 2. Id.
86. See id. at 1626-27.
87. See id. at 1627. Justice Kennedy added that "[t]his is so no matter how local or
discrete the harm, no matter how public and widespread the injury." Id.
88. See infra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
89. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. Three different standards of review have evolved
over time: "strict scrutiny," "intermediate scrutiny," and "rational basis review." See gener-
ally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ANERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16 (2d ed. 1988).
90. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 (citing Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642-43
(1993)). Under rational basis review, legislative classifications are presumed to be valid
"absent some reason to infer antipathy." F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct.
2096, 2101 (1993) (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)). Moreover, "the
Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the
democratic processes." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985).
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group, an exceptional and ... invalid form of legislation.
Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the rea-
sons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable
by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks
a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.9'
As far as his first point was concerned, Justice Kennedy ex-
plained how the Supreme Court requires a rational relationship
between the legislative classification at issue and the interest sought
to be advanced.'e If a law is narrow enough in scope and ground-
ed on a sufficient factual context, the Court will uphold it even if
the law seems unwise. 3 Justice Kennedy, however, found that
"Amendment 2 confounds this normal process of review;" and that
the amendment "is at once too narrow and too broad" because "[i]t
identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection
across the board."94 Justice Kennedy thus concluded that Amend-
ment 2 is "unprecedented in our jurisprudence... [and] [i]t is not
within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort."95
The second and more controversial theme that Justice Kennedy
explored was the notion that Amendment 2 "raise[s] the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed . . . is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected." The Supreme Court has
held that "a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."'97 Justice
Kennedy argued that Amendment 2 fits this conception of animus
when it singles out and denies homosexuals any particular protec-
tion under the law.9" While Justice Kennedy did identify
Colorado's interest in promoting citizens' freedom of association as
well as the State's interest in conserving fiscal resources in order
to combat discrimination against other groups," he argued that
91. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
92. See id.
93. See id. Justice Kennedy argued that "[bly requiring that the classification bear a
rational relationship to an independent and legitimate legislative end, we ensure that classi-
fications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the
law." Id. at 1627-28 (citing United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,
181 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an
apparent aim of the legislature, its impartiality would be suspect")).
94. Id. at 1628.
95. l Justice Kennedy argued that the guarantee of equal protection ensures that the
government will remain impartial to all citizens. Yet "'[e]qual protection of the laws is
not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."' Id. (quoting Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950)). This may explain why legislative classifications sin-
gling out certain classes of citizens for disfavored treatment are so rare. Id.
96. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
97. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
98. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
99. See id. at 1629.
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"[t]he breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these
particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit
them. ' '""u He held that it is classification of a group for its own
sake and thus does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose."'
Justice Kennedy never addressed the other interests advanced
by Colorado, let alone whether the expression of moral opposition
to homosexuality can serve as a rational basis for Amendment 2.
The most relevant case on homosexual rights, Bowers v. Hardwick,
was never even cited. Instead, his opinion closes by merely con-
cluding that Amendment 2 makes homosexuals unequal to all other
citizens and is not supported by any rational basis.'02 The State
of Colorado, as Justice Kennedy put it, "cannot so deem a class of
persons a stranger to its laws. '0 3
C. Justice Scalia's Dissent
While Justice Kennedy's majority opinion has been criticized
as short on legal analysis,"° Justice Scalia's dissent, which was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, has been
criticized as long on vitriolic rhetoric.' However, while it is
easy to dismiss the dissent as a characteristic Scalia tirade, it is
more instructive to understand what Justice Scalia believes are the
reasons for the majority's weak analysis. Justice Scalia made the
unusual decision to publicly read his dissent,"e which he began
by submitting that the majority "has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a
fit of spite.' '""a The Kulturkampf was German Chancellor Otto
von Bismarck's nineteenth century campaign of persecution against
the Catholic Church under the banner of secularism and moderni-
100. k4
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Romer, 116 S.Ct. at 1629.
104. See Stoddard, supra note 75, at A19.
105. See Taylor, supra note 74, at 27 (describing Scalia's dissent as "elegantly vitriol-
ic"); Mike McKee, Scalia's Dissent Dismays Law Schools, THE RECORDER, May 28, 1996,
at 5 (noting the "venomous tone" of Scalia's dissent); LEGAL TIMES, On-Line Exchange:
Getting a Read on Romer v. Evans, May 27, 1996, at 8 (quoting William Lockard as
stating that "Scalia's dissent is just vicious") [hereinafter On-Line Exchange]. Justice
Scalia's dissent has even been labeled "homophobic." Id. One law review Note employs
the label "homophobic right" to describe individuals who disagree with the homosexual
rights movement. See Note, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1905, 1910 (1993). Fortunately, one
commentator recognized that labeling Justice Scalia's dissent homophobic "(a pejorative
term coined by homosexuals in a transparent attempt to dismiss contrary views as irratio-
nal, etc.) is rather shallow legal analysis and does not contribute to a particularly mean-
ingful discussion of the decision." On-Line Exchange, supra at 8 (quoting J. Stephen Shi).
106. See Steve Rabey, Court Strikes Down Homosexual Rights Ban; Supreme Court
Decision, CHRIsTIANrrY TODAY, June 17, 1996, at 68.
107. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ty.' Justice Scalia's reference is an attempt to parallel
Bismarck's campaign with the Romer majority's claim that Amend-
ment 2 fails the rational basis test because it is a product of ani-
mus."° Justice Scalia characterized Amendment 2 as "a modest
attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional
sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority
to revise those mores through use of the laws." ' ° He found it
particularly problematic that the majority placed "the prestige of
[the] institution behind the proposition that opposition to homosex-
uality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias."' That prop-
osition is at the heart of the cultural debate in Colorado-and
America.112
Justice Scalia's claims flowed directly from the majority's
failure to adequately explain how it arrived at its decision. For
example, Justice Scalia first confronted the majority's dismissal of
Colorado's argument that Amendment 2 does not deprive homosex-
uals protection under laws of general applicability."' As ex-
plained above, Justice Kennedy had argued that "[i]t is a fair, if
not necessary, inference" that Amendment 2 does just that."4 He
also argued that this was unnecessary, in any event, to address this
issue given that Amendment 2 could be struck down on a narrower
ground."5 Justice Scalia agreed that it was unnecessary to address
the issue, but he offered a different reason for its supererogation:
the Colorado Supreme Court had already resolved the is-
sue."6 Justice Scalia cited a passage from the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion that apparently construed the reach of
Amendment 2-a passage that, according to Justice Scalia, the
majority "utterly fails to distinguish," even though it clearly
indicates that general laws and policies prohibiting arbitrary
discrimination would continue to protect homosexuals."7 To Jus-
108. See THE RECORDER, supra note 72, at 10.
109. See id.
110. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 1629-30.
114. See id. at 1626.
115. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 1630.
117. See id. at 1630. Justice Scalia cites the following passage from the Colorado Su-
preme Court in Evans If:
[I]t is significant to note that Colorado law currently proscribes discrimination
against persons who are not suspect classes, including discrimination based on
age, § 24-34-402(1)(a), 10A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.); marital or family status, §
24-34-502(1)(a), 10A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.); veterans' status, § 28-3-506, 1lB
C.R.S. (1989); and for any legal, off-duty conduct such as smoking tobacco, §
24-34-402.5, 10A C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). Of course Amendment 2 is not intended
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tice Scalia, the notion that assaults against homosexuals, for
example, would be legally immunized after Amendment 2 is
completely unfounded in light of the Colorado court's au-
thoritative construction of the amendment or even the text of the
amendment itself."' As he argued, Amendment 2 merely "pro-
hibits special treatment"9 of homosexuals, and nothing more.' '""e
to have any effect on this legislation, but seeks only to prevent the adoption of
anti-discrimination laws intended to protect gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.
Evans 11, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 n.9 (Colo. 1994), aff'd, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996).
118. See id. at 1630.
119. Despite Justice Scalia's understanding, there has been a real dispute over what
constitutes "special rights," especially in the context of Amendment 2. Compare Note,
supra note 105, at 191 (arguing that "Amendment 2 is not about preventing 'special
rights'; by making all private discrimination against lesbians and gay men 'immune from
legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level of the state government,' the
amendment actually facilitates private discrimination") with Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants
to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom,
69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 393, 400 (1994) (arguing that proponents of homosexual rights
are wrong when they claim they are seeking nothing more than the same civil rights as
everyone else). It is a battle of semantics to be sure. The State of Colorado had argued
that after Amendment 2, homosexuals would share an equal status with all other citizens
in Colorado-that is, homosexuals would enjoy precisely the same rights they enjoyed
prior to the enactment of the ordinances, laws, and policies conferring minority status
which were repealed by Amendment 2. Petitioner's Brief at 6, Romer v. Evans, 116 S.
CL 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039). The challengers, however, claimed that the State's position
was erroneous because prior to Amendment 2, homosexuals had a right to seek protection
against discrimination from all levels of government; after Amendment 2, they no longer
did. Respondent's Brief at 9-10, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. CL 1620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
Unfortunately, while the challengers are correct that homosexuals are not equal with
respect to having to amend the state constitution in order to secure specific rights against
discrimination, they evade the main issue of whether such rights are truly equal rights. In
reality, homosexuals are already protected against discrimination on the basis of race,
gender, religion, marital status, and other protected categories. See Duncan, supra, at 400
(arguing that civil rights laws are merely exceptions to the general rule which is one of
free choice); Michael J. Gerhardt and Tracey Maclin, 1995-96 Supreme Court Preview:
Mock Arguments in Romer v. Evans, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. 639, 646 (1995)
(discussing, in a mock argument, how "most citizens occupy a status in which they are
not given preferred treatment, in a variety of contexts, against both state action and pri-
vate action"). Laws such as these which enumerate a class of persons entitled to protec-
tion against arbitrary discrimination properly amount to special rights because they extend
protections that are unavailable to other, unprotected members of the population, whether
it be law professors, hot dog vendors, or left-handed persons. See Gerhardt and Maclin,
supra, at 654 (discussing how countless groups of people, like red-headed people, tall
people, short people, or overweight people do not enjoy special protections under civil
rights laws). In a similar fashion, homosexual conduct is one of those innumerable activi-
ties left unprotected by civil rights laws. Duncan, supra, at 400. Thus, Professor Duncan
argues that when proponents of homosexual rights legislation argue that they are merely
seeking the same civil rights as the public at large, they are very wrong. For example, if
a Jewish landlord were to refuse to rent her apartment to a member of the Ku Klux
Klan, the Klan member would hardly be protected from discrimination against his political
affiliation under typical fair housing laws. Id. In fact, all civil rights grant special privi-
leges in the sense that they involve the transfer of a property right from the title-holder
(say, from a landlord) to the member of the protected class (whoever that may be).
Petitioner's Brief at 7, Romer (No. 94-1039). Homosexual rights laws, like those Amend-
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Justice Kennedy's failure to address the Colorado Supreme
Court's potential construction of Amendment 2 is peculiar. The
general rule is that, except in extreme circumstances, "state courts
are the ultimate expositors of state law."'21 Perhaps Justice Ken-
nedy was unwilling to defer to the Colorado Supreme Court's
narrow construction of Amendment 2 because the language of the
amendment allowed such an interpretation. For example, Amend-
ment 2 prohibits the "enact[ment] [or] enforce[ment] [of] any stat-
ute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby [the enumerated cate-
gories] constitute... the basis of... any... claim of discrimi-
ment 2 was designed to repeal, offer special rights in the form of "the right to forced
association-to compel others to employ you or rent to you on the basis of your sexual
habits. Homosexuals are the only 'sexual minority' for whom such privileges are claimed."
DON FEDER, WHO'S AFRAID OF THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT? 87 (1996).
Some homosexual rights activists still conflate anti-discrimination laws with equal
rights on the ground that protecting individuals on the basis of sexual orientation is as
important as protecting individuals on the basis of race or sex; under such a view, equali-
ty would mandate treating similarly situated individuals alike. See, e.g., David AJ. Rich-
ards, Sexual Preference as a Suspect (Religious) Classification: An Alternative Perspective
on the Unconstitutionality of Anti-LesbianlGay Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. Lj. 491, 511 n.81
(arguing that "[tihe rhetoric of 'special rights' has been conspicuously used in support of
anti-lesbian/gay initiatives and referenda" and that this "blatantly mischaracterize[s] a prin-
cipled claim of persons to be free of invidious discrimination that is no more a claim to
special consideration than any other claim (for example, by African-Americans and wom-
en) to be protected from such discrimination"); U.S. LAW WEEK-DAILY EDITION, May
23, 1996 (quoting Denver Mayor Wellington Webb who argued that the true intent of
Amendment 2 was "the removal of basic civil rights to a targeted population"). Thus, in
the end, it may well be a semantics game whether anti-discrimination laws are really
special rights or equal rights. However, the real debate over homosexual rights should be
carried on at a higher level than merely the labels which attach to certain laws. Support-
ers of measures like Amendment 2 will obviously rely on the watchword of "special
rights" while opponents will rely on "equal rights." But the real debate should focus on
whether homosexuality is analogous to race or sex for purposes of public policy or
whether, instead, it is somehow less deserving of protection for a variety of reasons.
Professor Duncan, for example, argues that race is more deserving of legal protection than
homosexuality because race, unlike homosexuality, is a morally neutral characteristic which
has no bearing on a person's character. See Duncan, supra, at 402-03. He also argues
that one of the reasons for enacting civil rights laws was to rectify the economic depriva-
tion prevalent among blacks but that homosexuals are already economically advantaged in
America. See id. at 406-08. Whether or not such claims have merit, these are the types
of issues that must be debated.
120. Romer, 116 S.Ct. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Presumably,
even the dissent would find Amendment 2 constitutionally infirm if it denied homosexuals
the protection of laws of general applicability. Rational basis review represents the floor
of equal protection. Eliminating homosexuals from the coverage of generally applicable
laws would push them below the rational basis floor and thus lead to an equal protection
deprivation. However, the discussion over extreme applications of the amendment seems
beside the point given that Romer involved a facial challenge to Amendment 2. A party
seeking to facially invalidate Amendment 2 would have to demonstrate that under no set
of circumstances could the amendment be constitutional. See United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Thus, the extreme hypotheticals imagined by the challengers of
Amendment 2 are irrelevant.
121. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975). See also Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1984); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
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nation."' Moreover, it refers to "branches or departments" of
government, suggesting that even courts could not provide remedies
for arbitrary discrimination against homosexuals."z More likely,
however, Justice Kennedy may have simply believed that the Colo-
rado Supreme Court had not given a definitive interpretation of
Amendment 2. This would explain his statement that "[tihe state
court did not decide whether the amendment had this effect."'24
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy's failure to so much as acknowledge
the passage from the Colorado Supreme Court quoted by Justice
Scalia and explain why it is not an authoritative construction is
clearly a weakness in his analysis.
Whatever the case, Justice Scalia was more than willing to
take on the majority's claim that Amendment 2 was unconstitution-
al even under a narrow construction of its language. As an initial
matter, he argued that "[t]he central thesis of the Court's reasoning
is that any group is denied equal protection when, to obtain advan-
tage (or presumably, to avoid disadvantage), it must have recourse
to a more general and hence more difficult level of political
decisionmaking than others."'" Yet to Justice Scalia, if merely
describing what Colorado has done does not serve to refute the
equal protection challenge, then the Court's jurisprudence has
reached "terminal silliness" because the occasional need to petition
a higher level of government is the essence of a multilevel democ-
racy.' To support his point, Justice Scalia used the example of a
state law that prohibits municipalities from awarding contracts to
relatives of its public officials.'27 After the state law is enacted,
the group comprising the relatives of the officers must persuade the
state legislature to change the law. By contrast, all other citizens
need only persuade the municipality to award them a contract.
Under the majority's reasoning, this could be a denial of equal
protection.s Justice Scalia suggested, however, that the majority
did not advance this argument because it is clear that Amendment
2 is supported by a legitimate rational basis.29
122. COLO. CONST., art. I, § 30(b) (emphasis added).
123. See U.S. Oral Argument at 39-40, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No.
94-1039).
124. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1626.
125. Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. See id.
127. See id. at 1631.
128. See id. at 1631.
129. See Romer, 116 S.Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The only way it does not
satisfy normal rational basis analysis is if there is something "special" in making homo-
sexuals resort to a higher level of governmental decisionmaking, but "[tihat proposition
finds no support in law or logic." Id.
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Justice Scalia also argued that the majority eschewed the ratio-
nal basis inquiry, and for good reason. 3' The most relevant case
on point, Bowers v. Hardwick,' which held that the Due Process
Clause does not prohibit making homosexual sodomy a crime, was
not even cited by the majority.3  The continuing validity of
Hardwick was not before the Court since the challengers to
Amendment 2 did not seek to overrule it.'33 Nevertheless, Justice
Scalia persuasively argued that Romer contradicts Hardwick be-
cause if a State can constitutionally criminalize homosexual con-
duct, then it should be constitutionally permitted to take the lesser
step of enacting other laws that merely disfavor homosexual con-
duct, or merely prohibit all levels of government from conferring
preferential treatment on homosexuals.'34 One potential objection
to this "greater-includes-the-lesser" rationale might be that Amend-
ment 2 impermissibly targets the status of individuals with a par-
ticular sexual orientation, rather than the acts associated with
it-that is, those who do not engage in homosexual acts but only
have a homosexual orientation. 35 However, the Supreme Court
has upheld legislative classifications even though they could have
been drawn more perfectly to encompass only those individuals
targeted by the legislation.'36 Similarly, Amendment 2 is not con-
stitutionally invalid merely because it also applies to individuals
who do not engage in homosexual "conduct" or "practices."' 37 As
Justice Scalia put it, "[i]f it is rational to criminalize the conduct,
surely it is rational to deny special favor and protections to those
with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in the con-
duct."'38
130. See id.
131. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
132. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133. See U.S. Oral Argument at 53, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (No. 94-
1039).
134. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. See id. at 1632. In fact, Justice Kennedy referred to Amendment 2 as a "status-
based enactment" in the penultimate paragraph of the majority opinion. Id. at 1629.
136. See, e.g., New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (up-
holding policy against hiring methadone users as transit employees despite the fact that
some users pose no threat to safety); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding mandatory retirement scheme of age 50 for
police officers despite fact that many officers over 50 still possess capacity to perform
job).
137. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1632. Justice Scalia also added that since Romer involved a facial challenge
to Amendment 2, it must be established that under no circumstances can the amendment
be valid. See id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). Such a
facial challenge to Amendment 2 necessarily fails because, at a minimum, the amendment
can be applied, under Bowers, to those who engage in homosexual conduct. See id. at
1632-33.
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Despite the majority's grim depiction of Coloradans as a peo-
ple driven by animosity to pass Amendment 2, Justice Scalia ar-
gued that what a majority of Coloradans had done was "eminently
reasonable."'39 Coloradans had merely expressed their moral dis-
approval of homosexual conduct within the same moral heritage
that has also produced moral disapproval of murder, polygamy,
cruelty to animals, and so on.'" Justice Scalia chided the majori-
ty's portrayal of Coloradans as "a society fallen victim to pointless,
hate-filled 'gay-bashing,"' calling it "so false as to be comical.''.
Justice Scalia also castigated the majority for simply asserting,
in effect, that Amendment 2 is unconstitutional for no better reason
than that "it has never happened before."'42 Not only is this claim
false on the legislative level, as Justice Scalia argued, 43 but it
has also proven false at the constitutional level.'" For example,
the Eighteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibited
individuals from altering the national policy against prohibition
even through state constitutional amendment or federal legisla-
tion."
Justice Scalia, however, advanced his most serious objection to
the majority's reasoning with his discussion of the anti-polygamy
amendments presently in force in five States.'" The constitutions
of Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah each contain
a provision declaring that polygamy is "forever prohibited.' 47
Here, then, is an instance where "[plolygamists, and those who
have a polygamous 'orientation,' have been 'singled out' by these
provisions for much more severe treatment than merely denial of
favored status; and that treatment can only be changed by
achieving amendment of the state constitutions."'" In Jus-
tice
139. Id. at 1633.
140. See id.
141. Id. Justice Scalia points out that Colorado is one of the 25 States that have re-
pealed its anti-sodomy laws. At the same time, Scalia acknowledges the problem "which
arises when criminal sanction of homosexuality is eliminated but moral and social disap-
probation of homosexuality is meant to be retained." Id.
142. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1634.
143. See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text.
144. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. See id. at 1634-35.
146. See id. at 1635.
147. Amz. CONST., art. XX, 2; IDAHo CONST., art. I, § 4; N.M. CONST., art. XXI, §
1; OKLA. CONST., art. I, § 2; UTAH CONST., art. 111, § 1.
148. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Congress, in fact, required Ari-
zona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah to include these antipolygamy provisions in their
constitutions as a condition of their admission to statehood. Thus, Scalia argues that "this
.singling out' of the sexual practices of a single group for statewide, democratic vote--so
utterly alien to out constitution system, the Court would have us believe-has not only
happened, but has received the explicit approval of the United States Congress." Id.
225
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Scalia's view, either these provisions must now be unconstitutional
or homosexuals have greater constitutional rights than polyga-
mists.'49
Finally, Justice Scalia relied on Davis v. Beason,'0 a case in
which the Court approved an Idaho territorial statute that not only
denied polygamists the right to vote but also the ability to secure a
constitutional amendment, thus exceeding even the breadth of
Amendment 2.'"' Justice Kennedy offered only the most perfunc-
tory analysis of Beason in the majority opinion and argued that the
case "is not evidence that Amendment 2 is within our constitution-
al tradition" since aspects of it have been overruled.'52 However,
as Justice Scalia correctly pointed out, provisions that criminalize
polygamy and deny the right to vote to those who engage in po-
lygamy remain good law.'53
The majority's failure to persuasively distinguish how polyga-
mists were not impermissibly targeted in Beason but homosexuals
were impermissibly targeted by Amendment 2, led Justice Scalia to
suspect that what was really at work in the majority opinion was
that the Court was taking sides in America's culture war, some-
thing which is "no business of the courts (as opposed to the politi-
cal branches)."'54 Justice Scalia impugned the majority's invention
of "a novel and extravagant constitutional doctrine to take the
victory away from traditional forces" as well as its disparagement
of those who hold traditional moral values.'55 In fact, the notion
that Amendment 2 was driven by nothing more than "a bare...
desire to harm a politically unpopular group '  was, to Justice
149. See id.
150. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
151. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 1628. For example, a person may no longer be denied the right to vote for
merely advocating a certain practice. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per
curiam) (holding that criminal punishment of mere advocacy violates the First Amend-
ment).
153. See Romer, 116 S. CL at 1636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974)). Ironically, Justice Harlan, who is quoted by Justice
Kennedy at the opening of the majority opinion, joined the majority in Beason. See id. at
1636. Even more sirildngly, Justice Kennedy cited Beason in 1993, when he argued that
"adverse impact will not always lead to a finding of impermissible targeting" because "a
social harm may have been a legitimate concern of government for reasons quite apart
from discrimination." Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535
(1993).
154. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Several commentators describe
America in the midst of a culture war. See, e.g., JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE
WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991); Douglas W. Kmiec, America's "Cul-
ture War"-The Sinister Denial of Virtue and the Decline of Natural Law, 13 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REv. 183 (1993).
155. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
156. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
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Scalia, "nothing short of insulting."'' 7 Justice Scalia suggested
that the majority opinion is infected by the elitist views of
America's lawyer class and the law school view of what is wrong
with society, a view that contrasts markedly from the "plebeian
attitudes" that prevail in Congress." 8 Thus, Justice Scalia had
very little difficulty concluding that the majority's invalidation of
Amendment 2 was an act "not of judicial judgment, but of political
will.' 5 9
I. ANALYZING ROMER: A CATALOGUE OF POTENTIAL
EXPLANATIONS
As Justice Scalia's dissent effectively demonstrates, the paucity
of analysis in the Romer majority opinion is both unfortunate and
unacceptable. As Justice Scalia saw it, the majority brazenly dispar-
aged the expression of traditional moral values by a majority of
Colorado's voters and barely attempted to legitimize its holding
through reliance on substantive constitutional law. In the process,
the Court opened itself up to the charge that it was making law,
rather than interpreting it. The following subsections of this Com-
ment therefore catalogue the potential explanations for the Romer
decision in an attempt to reconcile its outcome with the Court's
existing jurisprudence.
A. Explaining Romer
1. The Fundamental Right to Equal Participation in the
Political Process
One potential explanation for the outcome in Romer was pro-
vided by the Colorado Supreme Court in Evans v. Romer ("Evans
"')16 when it held that there is a "fundamental right to [equal
participation] in the political process, and that any legislation or
state constitutional amendment which infringes on this right by
'fencing out' an independently identifiable class of persons must be
subject to strict judicial scrutiny."'' To establish such a right, the
157. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Evans 1, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993).
161. Id. at 1282. See also Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 430
(S.D. Ohio 1994) (relying on Evans I to permanently enjoin implementation of amendment
to city charter of Cincinnati which prohibited state government from granting special class
status on basis of sexual orientation, conduct, or relationship); Equality Found. v. City of
Cincinnati, 838 F. Supp. 1235, 1238 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Evans 11, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341
(Colo. 1994) (affirming holding of Evans 1). This Comment will designate the 1993
Equality Found. decision as "Equality I" and the 1994 Equality Found. decision as
"Equality II."
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Colorado court relied on several equal protection cases decided by
the Supreme Court concerning voting rights,62  reapportion-
ment,63 and "candidate eligibility" issues."6 However, the court
relied most heavily on Supreme Court cases involving discriminato-
ry restructuring of normal political processes, commencing with
Hunter v. Erickson." Hunter involved a charter amendment en-
acted by Akron, Ohio voters that, unlike with all other ordinances,
prohibited the passage of any fair housing ordinance unless first
approved by the electorate." The Court invalidated the charter
amendment arguing, among other things, that "the State may no
more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult
to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person's
vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of
comparable size."'67
While Hunter and its offspring all involv d race, a su, spect
class, 6" the Colorado Supreme Court depended on Gordon v.
Lance69 to support its theory that Hunter and its progeny gave
implicit recognition to a fundamental right to equal participation in
the political process.' Gordon involved a West Virginia
supermajority referendum requirement that demanded a three-fifths
vote before political subdivisions may incur bonded indebtedness or
162. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1277 (relying on Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No.
15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating requirement that voters have property or children)).
See also Harper v. Virginia v. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (invalidating
requirement of poll tax); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (invalidating requirement
that voters be civilians).
163. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1277-78 (relying on Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
565 (1964) (holding that "each and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and
effective participation in the political processes")).
164. See id. at 1278 (relying on Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers
Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979) (invalidating Illinois statutes discriminating against minority
parties in local elections); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (invalidating statute
making it "virtually impossible" for new political parties with widespread support to be
placed on ballot).
165. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). The Evans I court also relied on Washington v. Seattle Sch.
Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 467-70 (1982), which invalidated a statute, adopted through initiative,
that prohibited local school districts from enacting mandatory busing plans to achieve
desegregation. Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1280-82.
166. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 386.
167. Id. at 393 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). One commentator has
argued that Amendment 2 is even more burdensome because its repeal requires state-wide
majority approval unlike the amendment in Hunter which only requires city-wide majority
approval. See Note, supra note 105, at 1917.
168. For example, in Washington the Court repeatedly emphasized the racial nature of
the classification at issue. Washington, 458 U.S. at 471, 474, 485-86. See also Hunter,
393 U.S. at 391 (discussing whether the charter amendment "places special burdens on
racial minorities").
169. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
170. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d 1270, 1281-84 (Colo. 1993).
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increased state tax rates. 7 ' The Supreme Court upheld the law
but, as Evans I argued, Gordon distinguished Hunter on the ground
that the West Virginia supermajority requirement did not single out
an "independently identifiable group,"'" unlike the charter amend-
ment in Hunter.73 Thus, the argument runs, Hunter applies to
any law affecting an independently identifiable group, regardless of
whether it is a suspect class.'74
The court's reasoning in Evans I is faulty, however, because it
too easily dismisses James v. Valtierra.'7 Decided the same year
as Gordon, James expressly refused to extend the reasoning in
Hunter to indigent persons because they are not a suspect class. 76
In refusing to do so, James viewed Hunter as a suspect class case
rather than a fundamental rights case, as the dissent in Evans I
argued.'" James involved the constitutionality of a California vot-
171. See Gordon, 403 U.S. at 7.
172. Id. at 5.
173. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1281-82. The Evans I court pointed out that unlike in
Hunter where "[tihe class singled out . . . was clear--'those who would benefit from
laws barring racial, religious, or ancestral determinations,"' the Gordon Court did not per-
ceive any independently identifiable group or category that favors bonded indebtedness
over other forms of financing." Id. at 1281-82 (quoting Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5). Thus, the
Gordon Court found no part of the population was "'fenced out' from the franchise be-
cause of the way they will vote." Id. at 1282 (quoting Gordon, 403 U.S. at 5).
174. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1282. See also Equality II, 860 F. Supp. 417, 431 (S.D.
Ohio 1994); Equality 1, 838 F. Supp. 1235, 1240-41 (S.D. Ohio 1993). The Evans I court
argued that the language in Hunter speaks in broader terms than just racial discrimination.
Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1279. For example, the Evans I court noted that the Hunter Court
likened procedural burdens that make it more difficult to enact legislation with dilution of
voting power, and yet the Court cited Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Avery
v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), "neither of which had anything to do with dis-
crimination against racial, or any other traditionally suspect class of persons." Id. at 1279-
80. The Evans I court added that if cases like Hunter and Washington "were decided
solely on the basis of the 'suspect' nature of the classes involved, there would have been
no need for the Court to consistently express the paramount importance of political partic-
ipation." it at 1283. See also Note, Colorado's Amendment 2 and Homosexuals' Right to
Equal Protection of the Law, 35 B.C. L. REv. 221, 256 (1993) ("Even if homosexuals
are not a suspect class, strict scrutiny should still be applied as Amendment 2 interferes
with the fundamental right of equal political representation.").
175. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
176. Id. at 141. The Evans I court attempted to discount James by arguing that "[it] is
best understood as a case declining to apply suspect class status to the poor, and not as
a limitation on Hunter." Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1282 n.21. However, the court's argument
only serves to "underscore the Hunter Court's reliance on the classification being 'suspect'
rather than merely identifiable because the poor are certainly an independently identifiable
class of persons." Craig Cassin Burke, Note, Fencing Out Politically Unpopular Groups
from the Normal Political Processes: The Equal Protection Concerns of Colorado Amend-
ment Two, 69 IN. LJ. 275, 292 (1993).
177. See Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1298 (Erickson, J., dissenting). Several cases and com-
mentators have viewed Hunter's holding as predicated on an unconstitutional racial classi-
fications. See Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1099 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that the
amendment in Hunter was struck down as a racial classification); Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F.
Supp. 710, 718 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971) (stating that the principle
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er initiative that prohibited low-income housing projects from being
developed, constructed, or acquired by a state public body until a
majority of voters approved the project in a referendum.' The
James Court held that, "[u]nlike the case before us, Hunter rested
on the conclusion that Akron's referendum law denied equal pro-
tection by placing 'special burdens on racial minorities within the
governmental process.""" Additionally, unlike the referendum
provision in Hunter, the California amendment does not draw "dis-
tinctions based on race.""'8 The James Court thus concluded that
"[t]he present case could be affirmed only by extending Hunter,
and this we decline to do."'8 ' While some courts have relied on
Gordon's "independently identifiable group" language to strike
down anti-homosexual initiatives on the belief that Hunter repre-
sents a broader fundamental right theory,'82 the Kennedy majority
in Romer wisely avoided straining the language in that case in
order to create a new and potentially expansive fundamental
right,' 3 especially when creation of new rights is so strongly
disfavored. 4
from Hunter deals with classifications based on race); Citizens for Responsible Behavior
v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648, 655 (4th Dist. 1991) (stating that Hunter involved
strict scrutiny based on classifications affecting traditionally suspect characteristics); Robert
H. Beinfeld, Note, The Hunter Doctrine: An Equal Protection Theory that Threatens De-
mocracy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 397, 405 (1985) (stating that Hunter was based on racial
classifications); Seth Hilton, Comment, Restraints on Homosexual Rights Legislation: Is
There a Fundamental right to Participate in the Political Process?, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 445, 466-67 (1995) (stating that Hunter was a suspect class case).
178. See James, 402 U.S. at 139.
179. Id. at 140 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 141.
182. See Evans I, 854 P.2d 1270, 1280 (Colo. 1993); see also Equality II, 860 F. Supp.
417, 430 (S.D. Ohio 1994); Equality 1, 838 F. Supp. 1235, 1240-41 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
But see Hilton, supra note 177, at 464 (noting that "courts invalidating procedural burdens
on homosexuals rights [like Evans 1] ignore[] language in Hunter indicating that the Su-
preme Court applied strict scrutiny because it was a suspect class case"). Hilton would
nevertheless find a fundamental right to participate in the political process in the Court's
right to vote cases. Id. at 469-472.
183. In fact, the "independently identifiable group" language from Gordon must be
attributed to Hunter, James, and Washington in a post hoc fashion since none of those
cases used that phrase in its opinion. See Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1298 n.15 (Erickson, J.,
dissenting).
184. See, e.g., id. at 1291. See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986)
("The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution."); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33
(1973) ("It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in
the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws."). It is ironic that the point of the
fundamental right to equal participation in the political process is to foster the process of
self-government, and yet it depends on the intervention of the judiciary to achieve it. The
intervention of the judiciary can often be inimical to the process of self-government. As
Professor David M. Smolin argues, it is particularly dangerous for the judiciary to create
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It cannot seriously be doubted that Amendment 2 requires
homosexuals to resort to a higher level of governmental
decisionmaking (viz. a state constitutional amendment) in order to
secure the enactment of pro-homosexual legislation, and in that
sense, it tilts the political process against them. However, as Justice
Scalia observed, the occasional need to resort to a higher level of
decisionmaking is a hallmark of a multilevel democracy.'
Amendment 2 neither deprives homosexuals of their right to vote,
nor dilutes it;... it simply precludes the passage of certain statutes
and ordinances that benefit them. Homosexuals remain free to em-
ploy the same political process by which Amendment 2 was ap-
proved, but they are not free to guarantee the success of their
political agenda in that process. 7 However, the novel fundamen-
tal right theory fashioned by the Colorado Supreme Court, which
no United States Circuit Court has recognized,"'8 would essential-
ly skew the political process against the majority in favor of a
minority that is not a suspect class'8 9 -something unprecedented
in American constitutional law. 9°
2. Heightened Scrutiny
Even if Hunter is properly understood as a suspect class case,
several other potential explanations may account for the outcome in
Romer, including the possibility that the decision harbingers height-
ened scrutiny for classifications based on sexual orientation. 9
new constitutional rights that have no historical foundation and impose them on a divided
society because "[s]elf-government then becomes government by the judiciary." David M.
Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in Postmodern America: A Response to
Professor Perry, 76 IowA L. REy. 1067, 1100 (1991).
185. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. While the Colorado Supreme Court relied on right to vote cases such as Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Kramer v. Union Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621
(1969), as support for the fundamental right to participate equally in the political process,
the majority in Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1276-78, never argued that Amendment 2 infringed
on homosexuals' rights to vote. Id. at 1295 n.12 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
187. The Sixth Circuit made the same observation with Cincinnati's anti-homosexual city
charter amendment, an amendment paralleling Amendment 2 in denying homosexuals
preferential treatment of the law, and thus it reversed the trial court's holding that there is
a fundamental right to equal access to the political process. Equality Found. v. City of
Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 269 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996). The Sixth
Circuit explained that opponents of the city charter amendment "simply lost one battle of
an ongoing political dispute." Id. The Sixth Circuit's decision will be designated as
"Equality ILL"
188. See id. at 268 n.5.
189. See Beinfeld, supra note 177, at 428. (1985).
190. Cf. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Colorado's ac-
tions were not prohibited by any principle set forth in the Constitution).
191. See, e.g., LEGAL TIMES, Getting a Read on Romer v. Evans, May 27, 1996, at 8
(quoting David Sobelsohn) ("The bottom line is that the Court will now generally give
heightened scrutiny for classifications based on sexual orientation.").
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While the challengers in Romer did not appeal the trial court's
holding that homosexuals are not a suspect or quasi-suspect
class,"9 and even though the Court ostensibly decided the case
under rational basis review, 93 Romer could be another Reed v.
Reed.9 In Reed, the Court purportedly applied rational basis re-
view to strike down a sex-based classification,95 but in reality
ushered in heightened scrutiny for gender.I" Amendment 2, after
all, should have survived rational basis review, as Justice Scalia
contended.'" Courts applying the rational basis standard of re-
view will uphold a classification under equal protection "if
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide
a rational basis for the classification."'98 An imperfect fit between
means and ends, moreover, is immaterial as rational basis review
does not demand a "perfect fit between means and ends,"'" only
a "rough accommodation. ' '2"' In the absence of a suspect class or
fundamental right, the classification is presumed valid t" because
it is not the province of "the judiciary [to] sit as a
superlegislature [and] judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative
policy determinations. ' '2"' Our Constitution instead places
192. See Evans 11, 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 n.3 (Colo. 1994). The trial court had concluded
that homosexuals do not meet one of the elements of suspectness-to wit, political
powerlessness-and the respondents did not appeal the ruling. Id.
193. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627 ("[Amendment 2] lacks a rational relationship to
legitimate state interests"). See also id. at 1631 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court
evidently agrees that 'rational basis'-the normal test for compliance with the Equal Pro-
tection Clause-is the governing standard.").
194. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
195. See id. at 76.
196. See generally, TRIBE supra note 89, at § 16.
197. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the answer to
the question whether there is a legitimate rational basis for Amendment 2 is "obviously
yes").
198. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993) (emphasis
added). In other words, the use of the term "conceivable" means that the purpose or
rationale behind the governmental classification need not even be articulated. See Heller v.
Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2642 (1993). It will be upheld so long as it is possible to derive
a hypothetical reason. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179
(1980); McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'n, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). The State "has
no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification."
Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643. Instead, the party challenging the classification must "negate
every conceivable basis which might support it." Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts
Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973). But see City of Clebure v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432, 447-48 (1985) (striking down under rational basis review a zoning law affecting
the mentally retarded because the law was based on "a bare ... desire to harm a politi-
cally unpopular group" (citations omitted)).
199. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643.
200. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
201. See Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct. at 2101.
202. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). See also Beach
Communications, 113 S. Ct. at 2101 (holding that rational basis is not a "license for
courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices"). Thus, under rational
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faith in the political process to eventually rectify its own
improvident results. 3
Accordingly, it is not seriously contestable that Amendment 2
at least conceivably advances religious liberty and associational
privacy, for example, by prohibiting the enactment of statutes or
ordinances prohibiting individuals and organizations from refusing
to rent to, or live with, homosexuals.' Whether the means-end
connection between Amendment 2 and the interests sought to be
advanced is "made with mathematical nicety" is immaterial,"5 as
only a "rough accommodation" is necessary.2" Romer could thus
be understood as a heightened scrutiny case, which would explain
the Court's attempt to distinguish the anti-polygamy territorial
statute in Beason, a provision which Justice Scalia persuasively
argues is even harsher than Amendment 2.2"7
Is such a shift justified in light of Bowers v. Hardwick, as-
suming that Hardwick is still good law? °. A number of com-
mentators and some judges have argued that Hardwick is not dis-
positive of the equal protection issue.' For example, Judge Wil-
basis review, it would be the prerogative of the people of Colorado to judge the wisdom
of Amendment 2 because whether it "will meet its objectives is not the relevant question:
the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied if the people of Colorado could have rationally
decided that prohibiting homosexuals, lesbians, and bisexuals from enacting certain legisla-
tion might further a legitimate interest." Evans II, 882 P.2d at 1362 (Erickson, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted).
203. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (stating that "[t]he Constitution presumes that
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process"); Vance
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (concluding that "[a]bsent some reason to infer antip-
athy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process").
204. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text. In fact, the Sixth Circuit in Equali-
ty Ill, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), arrived at exactly this conclusion with a voter-enacted
city charter that is strikingly similar to Amendment 2 in prohibiting protected status, quota
preferences, and other preferential treatment for homosexuals. The Sixth Circuit argued
that this interest, among others, "[is] at least arguably advanced by the Amendment," and
it refused to impose its own view as to whether the Amendment was desirable policy. Id.
at 270. The Circuit Court further concluded that the Amendment could arguably save
taxpayer money by withdrawing governmental supervision of private conduct. Id. at 270.
Most important, it agreed that the expression of morality by the electorate is a legitimate
governmental interest. Id. at 271 n.10 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986)).
205. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2643 (1993) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
206. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
207. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Amendment 2 is "much more mild" than the anti-polygamy territorial statute).
208. See supra note 133-138 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Equality 11, 860 F. Supp. 417, 439-41 (S.D. Ohio 1994), affd in part,
vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (1995), and vacated, 116 S.Ct. 2519 (1996) (finding that
homosexuals are a suspect class); Jantz v. Mui, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1551 (D. Kan.
1991), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[A] governmental classifi-
cation based on an individual's sexual orientation is inherently suspect"). In addition,
several commentators have argued for heightened scrutiny for homosexuals. See, e.g.,
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liam A. Norris, concurring in Watkins v. United States Army,210
has argued that, first, Hardwick dealt with homosexual conduct as
opposed to homosexual orientation or status.2" Second, Hardwick
was a due process, not an equal protection, case and the two inqui-
ries implicate antithetical concerns.2 The Due Process Clause
protects customs that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition," whereas the Equal Protection Clause "protects mi-
norities from discriminatory treatment at the hands of the majori-
ty"2 3 Thus, Judge Norris claimed it was "perfectly consistent"
with Hardwick to hold that homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-
suspect class. 4
However, every Circuit Court after Hardwick addressing this
issue has argued that entitling homosexuals to special constitutional
consideration under heightened scrutiny is incongruous with
Hardwick."5 For example, the D.C. Circuit in Padula v. Web-
Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1985); Thomas
W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. RE v. 107, 140
n.178, 145-46 (1990) (arguing that a group harm analysis requires finding homosexuals
are a suspect class); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on
the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Cl. L. REV. 1161
(1988) (asserting that Hardwick does not preclude protection for sexual orientation under
the Equal Protection Clause); Burke, supra note 176, at 249-54; Harris M. Miller II, Note,
An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Scrutiny after Bowers v. Hardwick,
57 S. CAL. L. REv. 797 (1984); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation:
Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1285 (1985); Note, The
Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of Equality: Homosexuals and Heightened
Equal Protection Scrutiny after Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L. REv. 375 (1990) (argu-
ing that courts reasoning from Hardwick to deny homosexuals status as a protected class
have reasoned improperly).
210. 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Norris, J., concurring).
211. See id. at 716 (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
212. See id. at 718 (noting that the due process clause protects traditional values and
practices, while the equal protection clause calls them into question). In fact, the Supreme
Court has never addressed whether homosexuals are a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See
Equality I, 54 F.2d 261, 266 (6th Cir. 1995) (explaining how only Circuit Courts have
addressed the issue).
213. Watkins, 875 F.2d at 718 (Norris, J., concurring). See also Sunstein, supra note
209, at 1163. Sunstein argues that the Due Process Clause has been understood "largely
(though not exclusively) to protect traditional practices against short-run departures." Id.
By contrast, the Equal Protection Clause has been "understood as an attempt to protect
disadvantaged groups from discriminatory practices, however deeply engrained and long-
standing." Id.
214. See Watkins, 875 F.2d at 719 (Norris, J., concurring) (arguing that homosexuals
have suffered invidious discrimination regardless of whether homosexual sodomy is deeply
rooted in our traditions). In fact, the two inquiries may even be complementary since
"[i]n all probability, homosexuality is not considered a deeply-rooted part of our traditions
precisely because homosexuals have historically been subjected to invidious discrimina-
tion." Id.
215. See, e.g., Equality II, 54 F.3d at 266 (finding that all circuit courts following
Hardwick have denied homosexuals status as a suspect class); High Tech Gays v. Defense
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that heightened
scrutiny is inconsistent with Hardwick's rational basis review for homosexual conduct);
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ste2 1 6 held that the Hardwick Court's rejection of a privacy right
to engage in homosexual conduct foreclosed the possibility of
heightened scrutiny for homosexuals, even though the Court in
Hardwick never addressed the equal protection issue. 17 The D.C.
Circuit argued that it would be "quite anomolous [sic], on its face,
to declare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally
criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protec-
tion clause."21
Even apart from this anomaly, serious questions remain with
respect to whether homosexuals satisfy all the criteria for suspect
class status." 9 For example, some courts have questioned whether
homosexuality is immutable.' Further, there are also serious
questions as to whether homosexuals are politically powerles.
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that Hardwick's counte-
nance of the criminalization of homosexual conduct precludes suspect status for homosexu-
als); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding that it
cannot be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm after
Hardwick); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (contending that
Hardwick's permitted criminalization of homosexual conduct is inconsistent with strict
scrutiny for homosexuals as a class).
216. 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
217. See id. at 103.
218. Id. The D.C. Circuit added:
[I]n all those cases in which the Supreme Court has accorded suspect or quasi-
suspect status to a class, the Court's holding was predicated on an unarticulat-
ed, but necessarily implicit, notion that it is plainly unjustifiable ... to dis-
criminate invidiously against the particular class .. . .If the Court was unwill-
ing to object to state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class,
it is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrimina-
tion against the class is invidious. After all, there can hardly be more palpable
discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class
criminal.
idt (citations omitted).
219. In determining whether a group is a suspect or quasi-suspect class, the Court gen-
erally considers whether the characteristic defining the group is immutable, Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973), whether the group has suffered a history of dis-
crimination, City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985),
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976), Frontiero, 411
U.S. at 684-85, and whether the group is politically powerless, San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
220. See, e.g., High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573 ("[Homosexuality] is behavioral and
hence is fundamentally different from traits such as race, gender, or alienage, which de-
fine already existing suspect and quasi-suspect classes"); Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076
("[H]omosexuality is primarily behavioral in nature [and] conduct or behavior of the mem-
bers of a recognized suspect or quasi-suspect class has no relevance to the identification
of those groups").
221. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1634 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting "disproportionate political power of homosexuals"); High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at
574 (finding that homosexuals have the ability to attract attention of legislatures as evi-
denced by States and municipalities enacting anti-discrimination laws protecting homosexu-
als); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Homosexuals are not
without political power"); Steffen v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 7 (D.C. 1991), rev'd sub
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If there is one certainty, however, it is that in the end it would be
extremely ironic if Romer represents the watershed case on special
status for homosexuals, since this is exactly what Colorado voters
were trying to avoid with Amendment 2.222
3. Status v. Conduct
In the penultimate paragraph of the majority opinion, Justice
Kennedy referred to Amendment 2 as a "status-based enact-
ment.'' m Thus, there is speculation whether the Court invalidated
Amendment 2 because it irrationally targeted the "status" of homo-
sexuality as opposed to homosexual "conduct" or "practices. 224
The status-conduct distinction draws support from the seminal case
of Robinson v. California,m in which the Court held that Califor-
nia could not criminalize the mere status of drug addiction as
opposed to the conduct of drug use, which is legally
sanctionable.26 The Court said the statute violated the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.'
However, it is unclear how much explanatory force the status-
conduct distinction provides for Romer. First, as Justice Scalia
pointed out, several Circuit Courts have rejected the status-conduct
distinction as one "without a difference."'  Even the Colorado
Supreme Court argued that the four characteristics identifying indi-
viduals under Amendment 2-sexual orientation, conduct, practices,
and relationships--"are not truly severable from one another be-
cause each provides nothing more than a different way of identify-
ing the same class of persons."'29 Second, Amendment 2 is dis-
nom, Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated for reh'g en banc, 8 F.3d at
70 (D.C. Cir. Jan 7, 1994), affd en banc sub nom, Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (1994)
("[H]omosexuals as a class enjoy a good deal of political power in our society"). In fact,
the trial court in Evans v. Romer failed to declare homosexuals a suspect class precisely
because they fail the element of political powerlessness. Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV7223,
1993 WL 518586, at *12 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Dec. 14, 1993), affd, 882 P.2d 1335 (1994),
affd, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996) ("No adequate showing has been made of the political vul-
nerability or powerlessness of gays."). The fact that 46.6% of Colorado voters cast a vote
against Amendment 2 seems to clearly display the potency of the homosexual movement.
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
222. See Evans II, 882 P.2d at 1356 (Erickson, J., dissenting).
223. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
224. See On-Line Exchange, supra note 105, at 12 (quoting Stephen Gillers).
225. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
226. See id. at 667.
227. See id. (finding that narcotic addiction is a mere illness).
228. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1632 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See
also Equality III, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (ar-
guing that homosexual status can only be penalized when manifested in homosexual con-
duct). But see Equality 11, 860 F. Supp. 417, 439 (S.D. Ohio 1994), affd in part, vacat-
ed in part, 54 F.3d 261 (1995), and vacated, 116 S.Ct. 2519 (1996) (rejecting notion that
homosexuality is status defined by conduct).
229. Evans II, 882 P.2d 1335, 1349-50 (Colo. 1994).
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tinguishable from the statute in Robinson because Robinson dealt
with criminal sanctions whereas Amendment 2 deals with the re-
moval of preferential treatment." Under rational basis review, as
Scalia argued, "[if it is rational to criminalize [homosexual] con-
duct [under Hardwick], surely it is rational to deny special favor
and protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to
engage in the conduct."'" Thus, without the benefit of heightened
scrutiny for homosexuals and the fact that the Romer majority
never even cited Robinson, it is unlikely that the status-conduct
rationale provides much satisfaction.n2
4. "Active" Rational Basis Review and the Animus Principle
Yet another explanation for Romer draws support from the
Court's 1985 decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cen-
ter, Inc. 3 In that case the Court held that mental retardation was
not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. 4 Nevertheless, the
Court inquired into the legislative record to determine whether the
classification was related to a legitimate governmental interest or
merely "a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular
group. '' 5
By probing the record for a legitimate state interest, the Court
in Cleburne went beyond conventional rational basis review, under
which a law will be upheld if any conceivable state of facts pro-
vides a rational basis for the classification. 6 Instead, the Court
invoked what has been termed "active" rational basis review, which
some courts have employed even when refusing to subject homo-
sexual classifications to heightened scrutiny. 7 For example, the
230. See also Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[W]here criminal
sanctions are not involved, homosexual 'orientation' is an acceptable stand-in for homosex-
ual conduce); Duncan, supra note 119, at 403 n.39 ("[HI]omosexual rights laws operate to
protect (not punish) homosexuals as a class, so Robinson is inapplicable").
231. Romer, 116 S. CL at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232. Given that the primary impetus behind the homosexual movement is to validate the
lifestyle of practicing homosexuals, it would be a Phyrric victory for homosexual rights
advocates if States could only target conduct. See, e.g., Rhonda R. Rivera, Queer Law:
Sexual Orientation Law In The Mid-Eighties Part I, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 459, 515-16
(1985) (rejecting the status/conduct distinction as logically inconsistent and practically
unworkable); John Cary Sims, Moving Toward Equal Treatment of Homosexuals, 23 PAC.
L.. 1543, 1568 (1992) ("While it is possible that a few individuals might choose celiba-
cy, they would certainly not be large enough in number to justify analyzing the rights of
homosexuals as if celibacy were typical or even common.").
233. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
234. See id.
235. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985) (quoting
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1972)).
236. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
237. For a discussion on "active" rational basis review, see Burke, supra note 176, at
284-87.
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Ninth Circuit in Pruitt v. CheneyP relied on Cleburne when it
reversed and remanded a district court's dismissal of an equal
protection claim brought by an Army Reserve Officer, an admitted
homosexual, by arguing that courts must probe the "record" to
determine whether the government has a rational basis for a chal-
lenged classification."s9 Unfortunately, "active" rational basis re-
view does not really explain Romer given that Amendment 2 was a
popular referendum rather than a legislative enactment and thus
there was no record for the Romer Court to probe.2"
On the other hand, Cleburne also established that bare animus
toward a group is not a legitimate governmental interest24 Jus-
tice Kennedy appears to have relied solely on the animus principle
from Cleburne in concluding that Amendment 2 was born of ani-
mus and "a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular
group."' 42 In other words, he treated Romer as an illegitimate
purpose case, meaning that none of the grounds advanced to justify
Amendment 2 were rational 43
The illegitimate purpose rationale may well explain the out-
come in Romer, but it is not without its difficulties. The principal
difficulty is that Amendment 2 was a voter referendum. The judi-
cial difficulties associated with delving into legislative motivations
are already legion, but they are compounded when probing voter
referendums like Amendment 2, which have little or no legislative
history regarding their purpose or rationale.2" In fact, it is diffi-
cult enough for social scientists to scrutinize voter motivations, let
alone a Supreme Court that lacks the institutional competence and
infrastructure to make such evaluations. 245 That is not to say that
238. 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991).
239. See id. at 1166. See also Dahl v. Secretary of the United States Navy, No. CIV.S.
89-0351 MI.,S, 1993 WL 328364, at *1 (E.D. Cal., Aug. 30, 1993); Meinhold v. United
States Dep't. of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1453, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
240. See Evans II, 882 P.2d 1335, 1362 (Colo 1994) (Erickson, J., dissenting).
241. The Cleburne Court did not pioneer the animus principle. The Court in United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno also argued "that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." Moreno,
413 U.S. at 534.
242. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
243. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-47 (noting that some objectives are not legiti-
mate state interests); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 (1985)
("[P]romotion of domestic business by discriminating against competitors is not a legiti-
mate interest"); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 63 (1982) (rewarding citizens for past
contributions to governmental treasury is not a legitimate state purpose); Moreno, 413 U.S.
at 534 (excluding "hippies" from federal food stamp program is not a legitimate govern-
mental purpose).
244. See Evans II, 882 P.2d 1335, 1362 (Colo. 1994) (Erickson, J., dissenting).
245. In some ways, the animus principle from cases like Cleburne is really an easy
escape valve that enables the Court to invalidate a particular enactment it knows satisfies
rational basis review: it can simply infer animus when no legal basis exists to invalidate
[Vol. 47:207
AMERICA'S CULTURE WAR
the Court never probes motivation-it often does-but in all the
cases in which the animus principle was invoked to strike down an
enactment, such as Cleburne or United States Department of Agri-
culture v. Moreno,2" a legislative enactment was involved.247
While the Court in Cleburne also explicitly stated that "the elector-
ate as a whole, whether by referendum or otherwise," may not
violate the Equal Protection Clause,248 greater judicial caution is
warranted for a voter referendum which should be analyzed on the
constitutionality of its terms and conditions rather than by the
statements of some of the supporters behind it.249
The Romer majority was no doubt aware of the statements
made by some of the supporters of Amendment 2, including the
campaign literature of Colorado for Family Values which claimed
that homosexuals are "sex-crazed, disease-ridden perverts out to
destroy the traditional family."'  Yet even Justice Stevens, one of
the justices joining the Romer majority, has argued that "a political
decision that is supported by valid and articulable justifications
cannot be invalid simply because some participants in the decision-
making process were motivated by a purpose to disadvantage a
minority group. '5 In fact, the Sixth Circuit recently held that "in
the referendum context, it is impermissible for the reviewing court
to inquire into the possible actual motivations of the elector-
ate." 2  Rather, "the court must consider all hypothetical justifica-
tions which potentially support the enactment." '
a law.
246. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
247. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436 (involving local zoning regulation); Moreno, 413
U.S. at 529 (involving federal food stamp act).
248. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
249. Indeed, as Chief Justice Marshall recognized long ago, a valid legislative enactment
cannot be nullified merely because of its supporters' impure motives. See Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 131 (1810).
250. All Things Considered: Gay Rights Battle Heats Up in Colorado (National Public
Radio broadcast, Feb. 12, 1993). Of course, it should be noted that poisonous rhetoric is
common in election campaigns.
251. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 92 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
252. Equality III, 54 F.3d 261, 270 n.9 (6th Cir. 1995). See also Clarke v. City of
Cincinnati, 40 F.3d 807, 815 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1960 (1995); Ar-
thur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574 (6th Cir. 1986). The Circuit Court in Arthur,
for example, suggested that if the judiciary will probe voter motivation, it should save its
institutional capital for suspect classes-more specifically, race. Arthur, 782 F.2d at 573-
74.
253. Equality 11I, 54 F.3d at 270 n.9 (citing Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct. at
2101). But see generally, Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE
LJ. 1503 (1990) (arguing that less judicial restraint is appropriate when plebiscites are
challenged).
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Ironically, the Court in Romer cited to Heller v. Doe, 4 a
case in which the Court reiterated the rule that a classification will
be upheld if there is any conceivable set of facts to support it. 5
Yet the Romer majority eschewed this test. Instead, it engaged in
the precarious judicial enterprise of delving into the motivations of
Colorado voters rather than reviewing whether any potential justifi-
cations could hypothetically support Amendment 2. For the Court
to have suggested that the Coloradans who voted for Amendment 2
were engaging in "gay-bashing" is quite bold indeed, 256 especially
given that Coloradans have been fairly tolerant of homosexuality
and, as Justice Scalia observed, Colorado was one of the first 25
States to repeal its anti-sodomy laws. 7
The most likely explanation for Romer may be, as Justice
Scalia suggested, not that Coloradans were actually motivated by
animus when voting for Amendment 2-there is no real way for
the Court or anyone else to know this for sure-but that the ma-
jority believed that such stem moral disapproval of homosexuality
could be nothing but animus-a view that accords perfectly with
the views of the lawyer class and law school elite (and, in fact, of
academic and intellectual elites in general). 5
B. The Final Evaluation
While several less persuasive theories abound for challenging
Amendment 2," even the most persuasive theories explored
above fail to justify Romer. In the final evaluation, one finds a
litany of explanations but an absence of justifications. Thus Justice
Scalia's charge that the majority was merely reflecting the political-
ly correct views of the lawyer class and law school elite, and
254. 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
255. See id. at 2642 (citing Beach Communications, 113 S. Ct. at 2101).
256. It really is a short step to conclude that very few Coloradans were driven by
animosity toward homosexuals. See Taylor, supra note 74, at 27 (explaining how Colorado
voters were probably motivated by various concerns, ranging from association issues to
desires in avoiding cultural trends promoting homosexuality to their children).
257. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258. This Comment uses the terms "modem liberal," "liberal neutralist" and "academic
and law school elites" interchangeably.
259. See, e.g., Evans 1I, 882 P.2d 1335, 1351-56 (Colo. 1994) (Scott, J., concurring)
(arguing that Amendment 2 violates the right to peaceably assemble and petition the gov-
ernment for redress of grievances which is found in the Privileges and Immunities
Clause); Note, supra note 105, at 1919-22 (discussing potential First Amendment free
expression objections to anti-homosexual initiatives); Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Law-
making Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR
L. REV. 19 (1993) (arguing that anti-homosexual ballot measures violate principles of
republicanism found in the Guarantee Clause); Richards, supra note 119, at 493 (arguing
that anti-homosexual initiatives use public law to express "constitutionally forbidden sectar-
ian intolerance against [homosexuals'] fundamental rights of conscience, speech, and asso-
ciation").
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thereby choosing sides in the culture war, is validated.' It is not
as if the Court had no alternative but to choose a side in the cul-
ture war, of course."6I If that were the case, anytime the Court
decided a case it would be ipso facto taking sides, and clearly that
is unpersuasive. Justice Scalia does not contend that the Court took
the wrong side in the culture war." 2 Rather, his dissension flows
from the fact that the Court failed to serve as a neutral tribunal
that decides cases on the basis of substantive law rather than on
the basis of "the law-school view of what 'prejudices' must be
stamped out."' 63 The majority viewed Amendment 2 as bad
law-not because it failed the rational basis test or because it
deprived homosexuals of protection under laws of general applica-
bility (since it did not grapple with the Colorado Supreme Court's
apparent interpretation that it does not), but because it clashed with
the prevailing sentiment in elitist academic and intellectual circles
where moral opposition to homosexuality is seen as anathema to
the prevailing liberal Zeitgeist. Justice Scalia would leave the dis-
pute over the desirability of Amendment 2 as public policy to the
political process. In his view, the Court's proper role is to be a
neutral institution that invalidates unconstitutional laws rather than
a roving commission that patrols the political landscape to strike
down laws it dislikes.
As it now stands, legal commentators can only guess what
Romer may portend for other controversial public policy issues
such as prohibitions on homosexuals in the military or refusals to
recognize same-sex marriages-issues that the Court can simply
brand as motivated by bare animus in order to defeat traditional
views.26 Elsewhere, Court observers are left to speculate on
whether Hardwick has been overruled sub silentio' 6 or at least
260. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261. A separate issue, which is beyond the scope of this Note, involves whether the use
of religious moral arguments to support Amendment 2 violates the Establishment Clause
under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Under the first prong of the three prong
Lemon test, a statute or policy must have a secular legislative purpose. See id. at 612.
Whether Lemon is still good law is itself debatable. For a persuasive argument that it is
not, see generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Religion and the Public Schools After Lee v.
Weisman: Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 795 (1993).
262. Justice Scalia argued that it is not the role of the Court to take sides in the cul-
ture war. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
263. Id
264. See id. at 1629 (arguing that the question about whether "opposition to homosexu-
ality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias ... is left to be resolved by normal
democratic means, including the democratic adoption of provisions in state constitutions").
265. See THE RECORDER, supra note 72, at 10 (quoting David Sobelsohn) (discussing
how Romer will help the same-sex marriage issue).
266. See, e.g., Gay Rights Watershed? Scholars Debate Whether Past and Future Cases
Will Be Affected by Supreme Court's Romer Decision, 82 JULY ABA J. 30, July 1996
(quoting Doug Kmiec who suggested that Bowers has been overruled sub silentio).
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weakened by Romer.267 The most ominous overtone of the
Romer opinion, though, is the suggestion that the conventional
sexual morality of a majority of voting Americans cannot support
public policy decisions. In that sense, Romer is clearly inconsistent
with Hardwick, where the Court explicitly stated that traditional
moral views are a legitimate basis for state action." 8
In broader terms, Romer raises the concern that the Supreme
Court has become a confederate of the Cultural Left, mirroring the
views and values of America's lawyer class and law school elite
who detest the expression of traditional moral values in public life
and are actively seeking to root them out from political discourse.
The last section of this Comment explores this final, and most
alarming, aspect of the Romer decision with the intention of expos-
ing its shortcomings.
Ill. CHOOSING SIDES IN THE CULTURE WAR:
THE COURT, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SQUARE
In many ways, Romer v. Evans reflects the cultural divide in
America today between modernist liberals, as represented by the
Romer majority opinion, and traditionalists.269 A key battle in this
cultural war is being fought over the role of religion in public life
and the question of whether religious moral beliefs may properly
be brought to bear upon the formulation of public policy in a
liberal democracy. In one camp of this highly contentious philo-
sophical debate are modem liberals (or more precisely, liberal
neutralists) who believe that citizens should abstain from appealing
to their religious beliefs and convictions when engaging in public
discourse; in the other camp are traditionalists who believe that the
"public square" benefits from the presence of religious dia-
logue °
One might understandably ask just exactly how Romer reflects
the philosophical debate over religion in the public square. After
all, Coloradans may no doubt have debated the merits of Amend-
ment 2 on secular terms, such as whether the measure would effec-
tively advance associational privacy interests. At the same time,
however, it is also fair to say that many Coloradans supported
267. See id. (noting that scholars have debated whether Hardwick has been weakened).
268. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986).
269. Indeed, James D. Hunter describes America as involved in a cultural struggle to
define itself. See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA (1991).
270. The "public square" is Richard J. Neuhaus' term for the arena in which public
policy is fashioned. See RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBULC SQUARE 26 (1984).
Neuhaus characterizes the public square today as being naked because of the exclusion of
religion and religiously grounded values from questions of public policy. Id. at ix.
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Amendment 2 based on their adherence to traditional moral be-
liefs27-moral beliefs that, in many if not most cases, are in-
formed by religious principles.272
Romer raises the concern that traditional moral values will not
be respected by the Court. The real concern, then, is for the future.
While Amendment 2 could be supported on secular grounds, other
divisive policy issues-most notably, the ban on same-sex marriag-
es-are grounded primarily on traditional religious morality.273 If
Justice Scalia's criticism is valid, then the Romer majority not only
portrayed the people of Colorado as troglodytes for expressing their
traditional religious moral beliefs and attitudes toward homosexuali-
ty,274 but it also equated opposition to the homosexual rights
agenda with intolerance and bigotry.275 However, that is precisely
the unresolved debate being contested in America's culture war.276
The Romer majority, in effect, assumed the answer to the cultural
debate and concluded that Amendment 2 was unconstitutional be-
cause it was a product of animus.2' In truth, though, the real
source of animus today emanates from academic and law school
elites who not only scorn religion in general278 but also seek to
banish it from the public square in order to advance their own
moral agenda 9
271. See Kulturkampf, N. J. L. L, June 17, 1996, at 24 (discussing how Coloradans ex-
pressed their belief that homosexuality is immoral when they passed Amendment 2). In
fact, one of the most visible supporters of Amendment 2 was Colorado for Family Values
which distributed campaign brochures arguing that Amendment 2 was designed to protect
"traditional family values and structures" as well as to protect "individuals' rights to view
homosexuality as immoral." Plaintiffs-Appellees' Answer Brief at 10-11, Evans v. Romer,
854 P.2d 1270 (Colo.) (No. 93SA17), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).
272. For example, the moral opposition to homosexuality is, for many Americans, rooted
in Leviticus, supra note 1.
273. Take, for example, the argument advanced by West Virginia Senator Robert C.
Byrd in support of the Defense of Marriage Act, a federal law denying recognition of
same sex marriages: "Let us defend the oldest institution, the institution of marriage be-
tween male and female as set forth in the Bible." Eric Schmitt, Senators Reject Both Job-
Bias Ban and Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al.
274. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275. See id.
276. See id. at 1629.
277. See id. at 1628 (Amendment 2 "raise[s] the inevitable inference that the disadvan-
tage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected").
278. See David M. Smolin, The Judeo-Christian Tradition and Self-Censorship in Legal
Discourse, 13 U. DAYrON L. REV. 345, 388 & n.123 (1988).
279. See NEUHAUS, supra note 266, at 126-28. Richard J. Neuhaus further argues that
the conflict in America's cultural struggle is not between morality and secularism but
rather between two different moralities. Secularism is its own moral system which simply
calls itself "secular." Id.
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Some commentators strongly dispute the claims of traditional-
ists that American culture is hostile to religion."o They point to
the admixture of religion and politics in the last three decades"
as well as the recent increase in religious affiliation as refuting the
perceived trend toward secularization." However, such commen-
tators misconstrue the battle lines. Today, the real culture war is
being waged not between a small segment of highly devoted reli-
gionists and a larger, predominantly secular, society at large but
rather between the American people generally (that is, the people
of middle America where religion is vibrant and flourishing) and a
small coterie of intellectual elites who hold a deep distrust, and
often a disdain, of religion in public life. 3
The strident anti-religious bias among intellectual elites in
America toward religious expression in public life is well-docu-
mented.' 4 In animating this anti-religious bias, many in academia
and the legal community have endorsed some variation of the
280. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled
Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 357, 407-411 (1989-90); Oliver S.
Thomas, Comments on Papers by Milnar Ball and Frederick Gedicka, 4 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 451, 453 (1990); Mark Tushnet, Religion in Politics, 89
COLuM. L. REv. 1131, 1134-35 (1989) (reviewing KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CON-
vIcTIONS AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1988)).
281. See Theodore Y. Blumoff, Disdain for the Lessons of History: Comments on Love
and Power, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 159 (1991).
282. See Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere, 78 COR-
NELL L. REv. 747, 764 & n.53 (1993).
283. See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 278, at 388 (describing the cultural gap between the
people and the academic elite, including law school academic elites); James Boyd White,
Response to Roger Cramton's Article, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 533 (1987) (noting the "pecu-
liar" division between secular academics and people outside the academy who are very
religious). Such academic and cultural elites particularly despise conservative traditionalists
who combine two things these elites most dislike: modem conservatism and religion. See
generally FEDER, supra note 119.
284. See, e.g., Smolin, supra note 278, at 414 (criticizing how modem intellectuals
"deplore the reentry of Christianity into public life in any form that does not simply
reaffirm the secular liberal agenda"); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODs,
VIRTUES AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 13 (1991) (describing the "characteristic
liberal incapacity to understand religion"); KENT GREENWALT, RELIGIOUS CONViCTIONS
AND POLITICAL CHOICE 6 (1988); Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and
Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987 DUKE LJ. 977 (1987) (criticizing liberals for dismiss-
ing people who bring religion into the public square as fanatics); Richard J. Neuhaus, A
New Order of Religious Freedom, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 620, 623 (1992) (describing
how secularized university elites have tried to strip the public square of religious dia-
logue); Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Political Choice: Further Thoughts-And
Second Thoughts-On Love and Power, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 703, 721 (1993) (noting
religious illiteracy and prejudice "rampant among many secular academics"); R. Randall
Rainey, Law and Religion: Is Reconciliation Still Possible?, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 147,
150-51 (1993) (noting the widespread negative disposition, and even animus, among intel-
lectuals and law school faculties toward religion in public life); White, supra note 282, at
533 (arguing that "America is an extremely, sometimes fervently religious nation, at least
in its protestations and in some of its behavior as well, and one wonders about an
academic world that seems blind to this fact").
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liberal neutrality ideal, a theory of political choice advanced most
prominently in the works of John Rawls"'s and Bruce
Ackerman, 6 which proposes a radical dichotomy between reli-
gious argument and public discourse. 7 Liberal neutrality posits
that the moral and religious pluralism which characterizes American
society is a permanent conditionfs and that it is impossible to
achieve consensus among competing conceptions of the good
life.289 Therefore, in order to regulate conflict among these com-
peting conceptions and to preserve temporal peace, citizens should
engage in "the method of avoidance" whereby controversial reli-
gious and moral views are disqualified from the political pro-
cess.2" Liberal neutrality presupposes that religious arguments are
based on faith rather than reason and as a result "public reference
to the good should be drawn from as widely-accepted and publicly-
accessible an epistemic base as possible."29' What follows is an
"epistemic abstinence," as Joseph Raz denotes it,2' in which reli-
gion is privatized, and hence marginalized, because it is contro-
verted and hypothetically cannot serve as a publicly accessible
basis for political discourse.93
285. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JuSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUS-
TICE]; John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1987) [hereinafter Rawls, Consensus].
286. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, LIBERAL STATE]; Bruce A. Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J.
PHIL. 5 (1989) [hereinafter Ackerman, Dialogue].
287. Several variations of the liberal neutrality theme have also been articulated. See,
e.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 113-43
(Stewart Hampshire ed. 1978); DAVID AJ. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSITU-
TION 67-102 (1986); Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the Obligation
of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215 (1987); Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism,
18 POL. THEORY 339 (1990).
288. See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 285, at 4.
289. See David Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and
Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877, 879-81 (1993) (discussing liberal neutrality through
the philosophy of Rawls). See also Rainey, supra note 283, at 164 (explaining that "[tihe
liberal practice of privatizing moral controversy is premised upon the classical liberal
doctrine that government must be neutral toward competing conceptions of the good be-
cause there is no principled basis upon which we can resolve moral or religious-ethical
conflicts") (citations omitted).
290. See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 285, at 12-13.
291. Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L. REV.
2061, 2064 (1991) (reviewing MICHAEL PERRY, THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY
IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)). When participating in the public square, a citizen must
only tender reasons that others could accept. Yet "a person's reasonable belief that her
views of the world are true is not enough to justify 'public' speech directed to her fellow
citizens." Al. at 2065.
292. See Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, 19 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 3, 4-5 (1990).
293. See Levinson, supra note 291, at 2064. As Levinson puts it, the public accessibili-
ty requirement "would certainly exclude any appeals to justifications that rest on a privi-
leged episteme of revelation from a sovereign God and appointed messengers:' Id. See
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Champions of liberal neutrality, however, fail to satisfy their
very own premises. First, the antinomy between faith and reason is
not self-evident. Religious arguments can be based on reason just
as non-religious, or secular, arguments can be based on faith . 29 4 If
religious belief and argument were truly as irrational and publicly
inaccessible as liberal neutralists contend,295 then such liberals
should have no difficulty subjecting religious dialogue to the mar-
ketplace of ideas where, presumably, "public scrutiny will make its
rational deficiencies abundantly clear. ' 296  If anything, religion
should be privileged in public dialogue given its constitutional
status in the Free Exercise Clause.2' Second, liberal neutrality's
"neutrality" is belied by the fact that it privileges a particular con-
ception of rationality which is itself unverifiable. Reason, like faith,
is vulnerable to the same kind of epistemological attack.29 Third,
liberal neutrality fails to establish that the product of publicly ac-
cessible discourse is in any way superior to the product derived
from other forms of discourse.' 99 It surely overlooks the richness
also Hollenbach, supra note 289, at 896 (discussing liberal neutrality's division between
publicly accessible reasons and religious reasons). The degree of religious exclusion, ironi-
cally, is itself controverted among liberal neutralists. Bruce Ackerman, for example, advo-
cates that "[w]e should put the moral ideals that divide us off the conversationalist agenda
of the liberal state." ACKERMAN, LIBERAL STATE, supra note 286, at 16. Kent Greenawalt,
in a more moderate tone, recognizes that there are moments "when religious convictions
appropriately come into play and when they do not." GREENAWALT, supra note 284, at
76.
294. See William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 846
(1993). In fact, several theological traditions, such as Catholicism, hold that religious faith
can be rational. In such traditions, "[flaith and understanding go hand in hand."
Hollenbach, supra note 289, at 894. See also Rainey, supra note 284, at 161-62 (criticiz-
ing liberal neutrality for assuming the validity of its major premise that faith and reason
are irreconcilable).
295. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
296. Rainey, supra note 284, at 163.
297. See U.S. CONST. amend. L A potential objection to the Free Exercise argument is
that the Establishment Clause stands in conflict with the Free Exercise Clause by restrain-
ing the influence of the latter. However, it is also possible to view that Establishment
Clause as facilitating the Free Exercise Clause-that is, protecting and promoting the free
exercise of religion rather than stifling it See Neuhaus, supra note 284, at 628 (arguing
that the Establishment Clause "is a means and instrument in support of free exercise");
Rainey, supra note 284, at 167 (discussing the privileged constitutional status of religious
liberty which justifies religious influence in political discourse); John H. Garvey, The
Pope's Submarine, SAN DIEo L. REv. 849, 872 (1993) (discussing the same issue).
298. See Marshall, supra note 294, at 846. ("The belief that reason inspires moral or
political truths is just that-a belief.")
299. See id. at 847. Notwithstanding the various deficiencies in liberal neutrality re-
vealed above, another objection to the presence of religion in the public square proceeds
from an evaluation of religion's very nature. Professor William P. Marshall, for example,
argues that while religion is a highly positive social force, it also embodies a "dark side"
which sometimes justifies its truncation from the political process. Id. at 854. Religion is
a response to the existential anxiety that inescapably plagues humanity. Id. at 855-56.
When religious believers, who cling passionately to their beliefs in the face of this exis-
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and diversity that religion offers to bring to the public square."°
Fourth and finally, it is doubtful that, in terms of public accessibil-
ity, religious principles and tenets are any "less understandable to
the public than. . . the often obscure and pedantic language of
modem secular moral philosophy."3 1 In other words, liberal neu-
trality begs the question of whether religious arguments can ever
tential fear, are confronted with opposing belief structures that threaten to fundamentally
destabilize their own, they may perceive "these forces as threatening evils that must be
eliminated." Id. at 858. According to Professor Marshall, it is this dark side of religion
that has the capacity to transform the political process from a forum of constructive de-
bate to a battleground of a holy war and thus presents the strongest argument for exclud-
ing religion from public discourse Id. at 859. Professor Marshall argues that "religion's
participation in the political process can product dangerous results: Fervent beliefs fueled
by suppressed fears are easily transformed into movements of intolerance, repression, hate,
and persecution." Id.
Unfortunately, such an argument proves too much as it falls to distinguish religion
from other secular social forces. Professor Marshall acknowledges as much in a footnote
when he concedes that the secular ideologies of communism and fascism also have a
tendency to be destructive to the political process. Consequently, Marshall argues that
similar constraints might apply to such secular movements as well. Id. Regrettably, this
seems to be an unsatisfactory solution if it means excising all social movements that may
have a deleterious effects on political discourse. On that account, political campaigns
should be eliminated from the public square because the practice of politics in America
today is often highly divisive and potentially destructive with its frequent appeals to emo-
tion over reason. See Frederick Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L.
REv. 671, 695 (1992). In any event, it would be better to develop a theory of religion
and the public square "in terms that fit the discourse to which we aspire, rather than the
distortions that we fear." Robin W. Lovin, Perry, Naturalism, and Religion in Public, 63
TuL. L. REV. 1517, 1539 (1989). Clearly religion has its dark side, as history attests, but
it is not apparent that the risks justify closing off the public square to religion, especially
when one considers the contributions that religious insights offer into the human condition
and public good. See id. at 696 n.122 (agreeing with Marshall that religion in public life
poses risks but arguing that the exclusion of religion is not justified by those risks). In
fact, the lessons of religion and history may have little applicability to the American
experiment of republican government which, as Professor Levinson argues, is marked by
intense pluralism and "where it is simply unthinkable that the members of a particularistic
religion could ever capture national political institutions." Levinson, supra note 291, at
2077 (adding that excluding religion from the public square "seems gratuitously censori-
al').
300. See W. Cole Durham, Jr. and Alexander Dushku, Traditionalism, Secularism, and
the Transformative Dimensions of Religious Institutions, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 421, 462
(1993). Ironically, it is usually liberals who bemoan conservative ambivalence toward
greater "diversity" in the private sector and in academia, but here it is liberals who are
themselves ambivalent, and in fact hostile, to the diversity of religious opinions in the
public square.
301. Smolin, supra note 184, at 1085. Professor Smolin adds:
I doubt that the people of America understand the language of Kant better than
the language of the Bible . . . . The very nature of scriptural religions like
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam is that they posit an extremely public and
accessible revelation of God. The language of the Bible and the claim that it is
divinely inspired are generally publicly intelligible, in the sense that they are
widely available to the public and in the sense that their most important truth
claims are understandable.
Id. at 1085-86.
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advance public discourse. 02 However, even if it could somehow
be established that religious arguments are never publicly accessi-
ble, the same claim of nonaccessability would seem to apply to all
other conceptions of the good life which are also marked by in-
tense pluralism and are frequently incompatible. 3 In fact, Profes-
sor Steven Smith notes the "delicious irony" that plagues liberal
neutrality: it is one that insists on excluding religious beliefs and
values on the ground that they are not publicly accessible but then
invokes political theories that are accessible only to the academic
elites.3" Thus, in the end, it becomes very clear that liberal neu-
trality is plagued by several theoretical shortcomings which under-
cut its very viability.
However, in addition to these philosophical objections there
are also several practical objections. First, liberal neutrality is unre-
alistic in its approach to religious beliefs because it fails to account
for the central role that such beliefs play in peoples' lives."05 Lib-
eral neutralists cannot expect religious believers to bracket their
religious moral beliefs when engaging in political dialogue or when
voting in referendums, such as Amendment 2," because religion
is an integral part of a religious believer's existence. 7 Religion
cannot be treated like a piece of hearsay evidence that courts can
ask juries to disregard.0 ' A believer cannot simply disregard his
or her most fundamental beliefs."l
Second, and ironically, liberals deny their own successes when
they advocate the estrangement of religion and politics. Religious
principles, rhetoric, and imagery, after all, galvanized and sustained
the civil rights movement of the 1960's, one of the most successful
political movements of this century.310 As Professor Stephen Cart-
er observes, civil rights leaders were unabashedly religious in their
expressions and they "made no effort to disguise their true inten-
302. See Rainey, supra note 284, at 169.
303. See id. at 166-67. If anything, it may be more accurate to say that America is not
plagued by intense religious pluralism as over ninety percent of Americans subscribe to
some form of the Judeo-Christian tradition. See NEuHAUS, supra note 270, at 145.
304. See Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestab-
lishment Decision, 67 TEx. L. REv. 955, 1008 n.290 (1989).
305. See Lovin, supra note 299, at 1518-19 (arguing that liberal theories isolating reli-
gious beliefs from the public square are "curiously abstract" because they are unrelated to
the role religion plays in people's lives); Hollenbach, supra note 289, at 889 (agreeing
with Lovin that theories that insulate religion from the public square are impractical).
306. Liberal neutrality is not confined solely to political dialogue which citizens and
public officials engage in but also to votes that citizens cast. Lawrence B. Solum, Con-
structing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 729, 732 (1994).
307. See Garvey, supra note 297, at 872.
308. See id.
309. As Garvey has suggested, asking religious believers to put aside their religious
beliefs is like asking them to put aside the concept of color or shape. See id.
310. See Smolin, supra note 278, at 385.
[Vol. 47:207
AMERICA'S CULTURE WAR
tion: to impose their religious morality on others." '  Morality is
inevitably a part of political discourse and to advocate screening
religious moral beliefs from such discourse overlooks both Ameri-
can history as well as contemporary America. In both, one finds
that religious individuals have played an active role in the War for
Independence, the abolition movement, women's suffrage, labor
reform, civil rights, minimum wage legislation, nuclear disarma-
ment, restrictions on pornography, and welfare reform."1 2 For lib-
eral neutralists, then, to claim that the institutional separation of
church and state also mandates the separation of politics and reli-
gion is hopelessly misguided.313 It also ignores the fact that, as
Justice Scalia has observed elsewhere, "political activism by the
religiously motivated is part of our heritage."3 '4 At one level, a
theory that advocates limiting the role of religion in the public
square could be driven by the fear that controversial religious
moral beliefs may be corrosive to civilized public debate-a valid
concern, to be sure. However, the myriad shortcomings in liberal
neutrality lead one to suspect that it is not a theory devoted to
elevating the quality of political discourse in America but rather a
scheme designed to minimize the public influence of religious
moral beliefs, especially conservative religious moral beliefs, in
311. CARTER, supra note 284, at 229. Professor Caner argues:
[Lliberal philosophy's distaste for explicit religious argument in the public
square cannot accommodate the openly and unashamedly religious rhetoric of
the nonviolent civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. To be sure,
liberalism has had no trouble subsuming the goals of the movement under the
umbrella of secular argument. But justifying the results, after the fact, as a
matter of liberal dialogue does not alter the plain historical truth that the move-
ment itself represented a massive infusion of religious rhetoric into the public
square.
Id. at 227.
312. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CQi. L.
REV. 115, 144 (1992).
313. See Smolin, supra note 278, at 1091; see also Neuhaus, supra note 284, at 623;
M.G. "Pat" Robertson, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 223, 224 (1995). As David
Hollenbach has argued:
Even those who profess to support public neutrality on the meaning of the
good life find it difficult to live up to their ideal in practice. The interconnec-
tion of our lives and the common institutions we share make the demand that
we be silent on the deeper issues of how we should live together itself seems
like a form of repression. Is it really possible to maintain that fundamental
convictions about the meaning of the good life can be regarded as private
preferences rather than matters of high public importance in a society like ours?
Hollenbach, supra note 288, at 889.
314. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 615 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia has
also noted that "[o]ur society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain
activities not because they harm others but because they are considered, in the traditional
phrase, 'contra bonos mores,' i.e., immoral." Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,
575 (1991).
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order to assure a hegemonic mode of liberal discourse in law and
politics."5 One can always win the debate if one controls its
terms and liberals have been dominating.
316
Professor David M. Smolin encapsulates the entire subject best
when he argues that "[tihe flaw of most contemporary theories of
religion and law is that they try to guarantee that the nation will,
regardless of the people, not reflect the views of one's cultural
enemies."317 Such a goal is inimical to the principle of self-gov-
ernment under which the government should reflect the will of the
people.31 Through Amendment 2, the people of Colorado were
expressing their morality in an attempt to preserve traditional sexu-
al mores.31 9 Yet there is little difference between these attempts
and the efforts of modem liberals to enact anti-discrimination laws
declaring homosexuality to be an acceptable lifestyle, because liber-
alism is its own moral agenda.32" As Professor Richard F. Duncan
argues, homosexual rights laws like the ones Amendment 2 was
designed to repeal, "legislate one view of sexual morality-that of
sexual relativism-and then enforce this code of morality in society
to stigmatize orthodox religious believers as homophobes whose
religious exercise is nothing more than irrational bigotry (and thus
315. See Smolin, supra note 184, at 1087. Take, for example, the argument by Profes-
sor Smolin that theories of liberal neutrality are essentially devices to control Christianity,
especially theologically conservative Christianity, by relegating such beliefs "to a safe,
'private' realm where their impact on American public life, including law, politics, and
even public culture, can be minimized." Id. at 1072-73.
316. See Durham and Dushku, supra note 300, at 443 (arguing that the "systematic
privileging of secularism over religious traditionalism in politics . . [obscures] the true
nature, appeal and strength of religious conceptions . . . [and] robs . . . [them] of their
persuasive force, enfeebling them in the struggle against the secularist hegemony in the
public square.").
317. Smolin, supra note 184, at 1099.
318. See id. Smolin argues that "[s]elf-govemment . . . assumes . . . that the govern-
ment, although limited in power, will in its proper sphere reflect the will and views of
the people. Self-government, in short, links the quality of the people. Self-government
means that a Christian people will have, in some sense, a Christian government, and that
a pagan people will have, in some sense, a pagan government." Id.
319. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
320. See Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 DUKE LJ. 997, 1000 (arguing
that liberalism "is a very particular moral agenda (privileging the individual over the
community, the cognitive over the affective, the abstract over the particular) that has
managed, by very partisan means it claims to transcend, to grab the moral high ground,
and to grab it from a discourse-the discourse of religion-that has held it for centu-
ries"). The homosexual movement itself has a moral agenda. Specifically, it seeks to
discredit traditional moral authorities, such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, which all
profess that homosexuality is immoral. See the Jewish TORAH (Leviticus 18:22, 20:13), the
NEw TESTAMENT (Romans 1:26-28, I Timothy 1:9-10, I Corinthians 6:9-10), and the
KORAN (The Heights 7:80). The main thrust of the homosexual movement is not mere
toleration but absolute acceptance of the homosexual lifestyle as a legitimate and equally
valid alternative to heterosexuality. See Randy Shilts, The Queering of America, THE An-
VOCATE, Jan. 2, 1991, at 33 ("[Cjultural acceptability is why a gay movement exists").
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deserving of discouragement)."'3 2' Amendment 2, in turn, repre-
sented a political victory, as Justice Scalia put it, for "traditional
forces" who sought "to prevent piecemeal deterioration of the sexu-
al morality favored by a majority of Coloradans. 322  While
Amendment 2 may have been a major blow to the homosexual
movement, the presence of winners and losers in the political
sphere is not problematic under our theory of self-government. In
fact, it is a necessary concomitant of the theory. This is especially
true in America's culture war where two radically incompatible
conceptions of morality are competing for social legitimacy."
The problem arises when the Supreme Court decides to choose
sides in the cultural battle by ignoring relevant precedent and re-
flecting the views and values of academic and law school
elites,324 in effect declaring one set of views the winner by judi-
cial fiat.
Justice Scalia flatly stated that the Romer majority's claim
about Coloradans expressing animus toward homosexuals was
"nothing short of insulting. '"3"s However, not all will find the ma-
jority opinion insulting. It is only insulting to those who believe
that Supreme Court justices should not parrot the views of politi-
cally correct law school elites on the issue of homosexuality.326 It
is only insulting to those who believe that traditional moral beliefs
that are inescapably informed by religious principles deserve to
influence public policy which should reflect the cultural consensus
among most Americans.327 It is only insulting to those who be-
lieve that religious beliefs should not be exiled into some private
sphere where they become little more than a hobby." In other
words, it is insulting to most Americans.
321. Duncan, supra note 119, at 444. But see Evans II, 882 P.2d 1335, 1347 (Colo.
1994) (arguing that anti-discrimination laws "make no assumptions about the morality of
protected classes-they simply recognize that certain characteristics, be they moral or
immoral-have no relevance in enumerated commercial contexts").
322. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
323. Self-government and civil liberty do not mean that there are no winners or losers.
See Smolin, supra note 184, at 1099.
324. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
choosing sides in the culture war).
325. Id.
326. See id. (criticizing the majority for reflecting the "law-school view of what 'preju-
dices' must be stamped out").
327. See Hollenbach, supra note 289, at 900 ("In general, public policy should reflect
the cultural consensus about the social good that is present among people").
328. See Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hob-
by, 1987 DUKE LJ. 977, 996 (1987) (criticizing liberals for treating religion "like building
model airplanes, something quiet, something private, something trivial-and not really a fit
activity for intelligent, public-spirited adults').
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CONCLUSION
The homosexual movement will no doubt view Romer as a
cause celebre, but the decision may be too hollow a victory to
offer any hope for the future. As Justice Scalia expressed in dis-
sent, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion is long on principles of
righteousness but short on judicial precedent, and unfortunately,
majestic platitudes do not make constitutional law---concrete legal
analysis does. The Romer majority's commitment to self-govem-
ment and adherence to the rule of law is seriously questioned
when, acting as a superlegislature, it invents, rather than interprets,
constitutional law, fails to distinguish highly relevant cases, im-
pugns the motives of the Colorado electorate, chooses sides in
America's culture war by reflecting the politically correct views of
intelligentsia, equates opposition to homosexuality with racial bias,
and offers only explanations but no justification for its holding.
Romer, perhaps better than any other case to date, reveals the
intellectual bankruptcy of the Cultural Left and how the Court is
quickly becoming its most powerful instrument for imposing its
elitist values on unwilling majorities.329 The most disturbing as-
pect of Romer is the Court's suggestion that the expression of
traditional religious morality-a morality, it should be noted, which
founded and has sustained this Nation for 200 years-is somehow
a manifestation of intolerance or, worse yet, hatred, if used to sup-
port public policy decisions such as Amendment 2. Justice Scalia
once observed, not surprisingly, that "those who adopted our Con-
stitution .. .believed that the public virtues inculcated by religion
are a public good.""33 It is only too unfortunate that the wisdom
of the Framers has been lost on today's Court.
STEVEN A. DELCHIN
329. According to Robert Bork
It will be extremely difficult to defend traditional values against intellectual
class onslaught. Not only do the intellectuals occupy commandeering heights of
the culture and the means by which values and ideas are created and transmit-
ted, they control the most authoritarian institution of the American government,
the federal and state judiciaries, headed by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The courts have increasingly usurped the power to make our cultural
decisions for us ....
ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERI-
CAN DEcLiNE 95 (1996).
330. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2151 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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